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Abstract
This paper analyzes the importance of legal property documents in providing tenure security,
enhancing agricultural investment incentives and easing access to credit. While theory predicts
that better property rights on land can increase investment through increased security, enhanced
trade opportunities and increased collateral value of land, the presence and size of these eﬀects
depend crucially on whether those rights are properly enforced. In Nicaragua, a troubled history of
land expropriation and invasion has undermined the credibility of the legal property regime. The
variation in legal ownership status due to a land titling and regularization programme is studied to
identify the eﬀects of legal ownership documents. Possession of a registered document is found to
increase the probability of carrying out land-attached investments by 35%. No diﬀerence is found
in the eﬀect of public deeds and agrarian reform titles provided they are both registered and we
ﬁnd no strong evidence of a credit supply link, thus suggesting security of tenure as the channel
through which formal land ownership has an eﬀect on investment.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Institutions and their evolution play a key role in shaping the environment in which economic agents
interact, and because property relations are the backbone of the economic structure of society (Bardhan,
1989), the codiﬁcation and enforcement of property rights are considered as important preconditions
for economic growth and development. In agrarian societies land is not only an essential factor of
production and thereby the main means for households to generate a livelihood, it is often also the
main means of wealth accumulation and transfer. As such, it determines not only a household’s ability
to produce, but also their social and economic status and even their collective identity (Deininger and
Feder, 1998).
Moreover, at the aggregate level, the distribution of property rights in land and its evolution is closely
linked to the evolution of power relations, technological change and population pressure (Binswanger,
Deininger and Feder, 1995). Diﬀerences in systemic property rights security have been posited to
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1cause or at least be associated with aggregate economic performance (see North (1981) for a historical
perspective).
Secure, alienable and veriﬁable property rights to land are regarded as crucial because they have
ap r o f o u n de ﬀect on the incentives and constraints faced by agents, and thereby on the working of
markets for land and capital (Feder and Feeny, 1991). Security provides agents with the incentives
to use land eﬃciently and to invest in its future productivity, especially when property rights can
be bequeathed. Alienable and veriﬁable property rights decrease the costs of transacting land in the
market by decreasing informational asymmetries. They do so in part by granting land and alternate,
formal existence (de Soto, 2000). Thus the market for land can be expected to allocate the asset more
eﬃciently. Finally, by allowing lenders to foreclose, it allows the use of land as collateral and increases
credit supply.
There is little discrepancy on the theoretical underpinnings of these mechanisms. However, they rely
on strong assumptions about the property rights system: it should be able to deﬁne, document, record
and enforce property rights and changes in property rights in a way that is transparent and accessible.
Moreover, the latter two mechanisms assume that land, credit and other factor markets function well.
While care should be exercised not to identify documented land tenure with secure land tenure,
land documentation, titling and registration programmes have become a widely used instrument in the
endeavour to publicly provide secure tenure, especially in less developed countries. However, in many
developing countries, public property systems and particularly land administration institutions such as
cadastres and public registries are imperfect and mistrusted. Moreover, informational asymmetries and
transactions costs are likely to make markets function less than fully eﬃciently and credit markets are
underdeveloped. It is therefore not self-evident that titling and registration can provide tenure security
or any other beneﬁtt ob e n e ﬁciaries. Because of this, there has been much debate on the relative beneﬁts
and costs of reform aiming to enhance land tenure security by providing legal guarantees of property, as
well as the distributional eﬀects of such policies, especially when they are designed to replace customary
property rights regimes (Platteau, 2000).
The large number of policy interventions spurred a substantial literature concerned with the ef-
fects of tenure security and titling programmes on various economic outcomes, with special emphasis
on investment and access to credit.1 Since the work of Besley (1995), particular attention has been
devoted to the possible endogeneity of property rights and tenure security with respect to investment,
in particular to the fact that visible investment, such as tree planting, can grant tenure security. This
mechanism would tend to bias estimated eﬀects upwards, which Besley (1995) ﬁnds in one of the regions
studied. Other economic studies having explicitly acknowledged the possible endogeneity of land rights
include Carter, Wiebe and Blarel (1994) for Kenya; Alston, Libecap and Schneider (1996) for Brazil;
Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002) for Burkina Faso and Deininger, Jin, Adenew, Gebre-Selassie
and Nega (2003) for Ethiopia. Results from these exercises do suggest that, especially in Africa, a large
proportion of investment is carried out in order to increase security.
However, another mechanism proposed by Besley (1998) has received less attention. When titling
and registration programmes are on demand rather than compulsory or area-based, the decision to
seek title and register it is endogenous and an observed positive eﬀect could be picking up unobserved
characteristics which are correlated with this decision, such as the greater entrepreneurship or better
ﬁnancial means of the household.
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of legal documents certifying ownership of land in
Nicaragua on investment, while attempting to shed some light on the mechanisms at work and to
examine the potential endogeneity of legal status in more detail than has been done in the past.
We must stress at this point the distinction between property rights and property documents,w h i c h
are the focus of this paper. Formal property documents are proof that the property rights of an
1See Besley (1998) for a survey of the literature and Deininger (2003) for a survey of the more recent literature with
an emphasis on policy lessons and interventions.
2individual are backed by the powers of the state, at least in theory. There is not necessarily a one-
to-one correspondence between formal property documents and tenure security. While conditional on
enforcement by the police and the judicial system, property documents should grant secure property
rights, they are by no means a necessary condition. On the one hand, the law in Nicaragua and most
countries — both developing and industrialised — will recognise and protect some forms of tenure - such
as long standing possession - even if they are not backed by a formal document2. On the other hand,
tenure security may be achieved via informal channels of deﬁnition and enforcement.
A history of land reforms, with varying motives and legal underpinnings, has created a complex
structure of land rights in Nicaragua, both in its legal foundations and on the ﬁeld. The corresponding
episodes of land expropriation by the state and the use of land grabs as a means of access to land
by various segments of the population have severely increased tenure insecurity and have also severely
undermined the strength and credibility of the property rights system itself, especially land adminis-
tration institutions3. In this context, Nicaragua undertook a large titling programme to regularize the
situation of beneﬁciaries of the successive waves of land reform. Due to the especially acute institutional
problems in Nicaragua, we view this as a particularly stiﬀ test of the theoretical mechanisms posited in
the literature.
Additionally, the on-demand nature of the Nicaraguan titling programme and the declarative na-
ture of the Nicaraguan Public Registry mean that there is a potential problem of endogeneity of the
registration status of plots.
Previous studies of the Nicaraguan case include those of Foltz, Larson and Lopez (2000) who study
the North-western region of Nicaragua and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of land titles on investment other
than trees; Broegaard, Heltberg and Malchow-Møller (2002) estimate a joint model for several outcomes
to ﬁnd that perennial crop adoption and tenure security are positively aﬀected by titles, but that wealth
is a major determinant of security; they consider explicitly the potential endogeneity of tenure security
but not that of the legal status of land. Finally, Deininger and Chamorro (2004) ﬁnd large eﬀects of
receipt of registered titles on land values and investment although they do not consider the potential
endogeneity of these.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical underpinnings
of the “investment eﬀect” of legal ownership, as well as more extensive details on the property regime
in Nicaragua and the data used, section 3 presents basic results, while section 4 deals with econometric
issues arising from the main results, including endogeneity of the main independent variable describing
legal status. Section 5 looks at the impact of ownership documents on credit supply as a potential
mechanism for the investment eﬀect and section 6 summarises and concludes.
2 Background and data
2.1 Investment eﬀects of land property documentation: theoretical back-
ground
While viewed in most of the literature as a proxy for tenure security, legal ownership status has received
more attention on its own right as a consequence of de Soto’s (2000) inﬂuential book, which puts the
property system at the centre of the process of capital creation.
We view formal land property, meaning land ownership which is sanctioned by a property title or
deed which is recognised by the state, as essentially formalising property rights, i.e. creating a formal
2Nicaragua, Civil Code Art. 1732 to 1740.
3Land administration institutions comprise the Public Registries and the Cadastre, but property rights institutions
also include those institutions granting property rights (the executive) and protecting them (the police, the judiciary).
4This paper was only known to me in its working paper version (Deininger and Chamorro, 2002) while work was
carried out for the present paper.
3representation of the ownership of various property rights over a plot of land, including ownership,
usufruct and alienability, among others.5 It has to be recognised that this formalisation often comes
at the price of the standardisation of those rights Less common forms of economic organisation or land
ownership, such as those used by indigenous communities that follow customary laws, can thereby ﬁnd
themselves at odds with the prevailing formal legal ediﬁce. This type of transition has been widely
studied in the case of several African countries (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1993) but customary land
tenure regimes remain understudied in Latin America and our data does not allow us to ﬁll this gap.
This formal representation of land rights is then recognised by the state and (eventually) by society
at large as part of the social contract. Essentially, the title functions like a contract between the holder
and the state, with the latter pledging to recognise the former’s property rights and protect them,
including from conﬁscation by the state itself.6
The need for land administration institutions arises from the need to verify that the set of titles
in the economy form a coherent whole. On the one hand, rights over a plot can potentially coexist if
they refer to diﬀerent forms of property right. On the other hand, it is necessary that the information
contained in diﬀerent titles coincides with respect to the physical boundaries over which the rights are
deﬁned, as well as the limits of those rights. The two most relevant institutions are the Cadastre,
whose role is to associate titles to geographic boundaries of plots as described by maps, and the Public
Registry, whose role is to record the titles or transfer deeds held over each plot.7 Registration provides
an extra layer of security to the title holder as it guarantees that no other (registered) title exists that
contradicts his or her rights. In essence, it makes the contract between the title holder and the state
veriﬁable by a third party.
We can now give the main theoretical predictions of the eﬀect of having a property document from
this point of view8:
1. Insofar as it enhances land tenure security, an ownership document decreases the probability of
unwanted expropriation or conﬁscation and provides incentives for investment in land-attached
capital, as the full return from this investment is reaped by the owner.
2. Insofar as it expresses the relevant economic characteristics of the land in a way that is stan-
dardised (and hence understandable) and veriﬁable and provided property rights are alienable,
possession of a title decreases the transactions costs faced by the owner when alienating all (sell-
ing) or part (renting out, mortgaging, etc...) of his or her property rights. This in turn implies
that the owner of the plot is able to increase the value of the land or alternatively to recoup the
value of any investment at the time of the sale, thereby increasing the returns from investment.9
3. Provided possession of a title increases security or decreases the cost of verifying the information
contained in the title or has otherwise an eﬀect on the value of land, a formal title that represents
alienable rights will increase the collateral value of land. Besley (1995) and Feder, Onchan,
Chalamwong and Hongladarom (1988) explain this in slightly diﬀerent ways, the former by a
decrease in the rate of interest due to the higher expected value of the collateral, the latter
through the relaxation of a credit rationing constraint, but the essential argument is unchanged:
the household now faces greater supply at a given interest rate.
5Property rights over land often overlap even when no conﬂict is present. For example, most governments reserve
themselves property rights over underground natural resources.
6Throughout this paper, we distinguish between expropriation (forced sale to the state) and conﬁscation (appropriation
by the state). This distinction is often overlooked in the economic literature but is central to the legal issues surrounding
property in Nicaragua.
7Background on land institutions draws on Deininger (2003), Dekker (2003) and, for the case of Nicaragua, World
Bank (2003).
8See Besley (1995) for example, for a formalisation of some of these eﬀects.
9Notice that this is true for a given degree of security (as measured by the probability per period of losing the land).
In theory diﬀerent degrees of transactability would have diﬀerent eﬀects.
4While much of the attention received by titling programmes in the earlier literature was aimed at
the last eﬀect (the “credit supply” or “collateral” eﬀect) prompted in particular by the ﬁndings of
Feder et al. (1988), who ﬁnd the credit channel to be at the source of the eﬀect in Thailand, and by
the arguments in de Soto (2000), it is clear from the above that even if the credit eﬀect is not present,
then an increase in land-attached or land-related investment (an “investment eﬀect”) may still exist:
as the expected return from land-attached increases, the household will reallocate resources from other
assets (e.g. cattle but also other capital goods) towards land as well as land-attached assets, such
as improvements on land (irrigation, fences, etc.), as described formally by Carter and Olinto (2003).
However, in this case, while it is clear that the land owner is better oﬀ with the title, a measurement of
land-attached investment constitutes an overestimation of the welfare eﬀect of the titling intervention.
Land titling is usually viewed as increasing security of tenure for land owners10.I n f a c t ,w h e t h e r
security increases depends crucially on whether the formalised rights have an informal correspondence;
in other words, if there exist informal mechanisms that protect property rights or if there is no threat
on property rights, then we would not expect titling to increase tenure security, and if formal rights are
not protected and enforced by the police or the courts, we would not expect titling to change tenure
security either.
On the other hand, whether security is increased or not, formalisation of property rights will have
the eﬀect of reducing informational asymmetries on the ownership status of the plot of land. This means
that the trade opportunities are likely to increase, as trade with individuals who are not members of
the same community is made less costly. It also means that, because asymmetries are reduced between
borrowers and lenders, the collateral value of land will increase, thereby increasing the amount of credit
available.
Given the two eﬀects above, one would also expect the formalization of property to increase the
market price of land, as it now incorporates a premium due to the increase in the credit ration (or
a decrease in the borrowing rate) that is associated to it, as well as a premium due to the enhanced
liquidity of the plot in case of trade. This increase of value may reinforce the credit eﬀect if it exists.
The increase in land values is empirically conﬁrmed for the Nicaraguan case by Deininger and Chamorro
(2004).
The pattern of land distribution and population management during the colonial period and the
dominance of haciendas that followed in Nicaragua, as in most of Latin America (see Binswanger et al.
(1995) for a detailed account of the emergence of property rights) seriously weakened indigenous cus-
tomary forms of land ownership or restricted them to areas where indigenous people were concentrated.
However this is not to say that local networks are weak. They remain “an indispensable day-to-day
reference for economic and social interaction in the local territory” (Bastiaensen, 1997) and often hold
the key to “access to government and outside markets”. Therefore, even if social networks do not shape
property rights, they may still shape the way these rights are enforced.
Overall, we would expect formal titles to increase tenure security, but ultimately this is not necessary
for them to have an eﬀect on investment. If they do increase tenure security, then all the theoretical
arguments above point to an unambiguous increase in productive investment.
One very important caveat to all the above is the existence of sometimes signiﬁcant costs of accessing
legal recognition of ownership or maintaining an up-to-date legal document. Obtaining and registering
a transfer deed or a property title necessitates the services of several professionals, including at least
a notary and probably also recognised measuring services. Registering a property title or deed often
implies recognising liability for land taxes when they exist, or income and capital gains taxes in other
cases. Therefore, while we would expect beneﬁts to greatly outweigh costs at least in the long run, titling
and/or registration can‘ entail a substantial cost for the agent, the titling agency or the state. In turn,
this means that when the decision to seek title or registration is left to the household, the household
is left to weigh costs and beneﬁts, something that begs the question of the endogeneity of legal land
10We do not consider the eﬀect land titling can have on security of tenure for households renting land.
5status. Because the costs have been widely overlooked in the literature, this source of endogeneity has
in turn received less attention than it warrants.
2.2 Background: the land property regime in Nicaragua
The stability of the land property regime in Nicaragua has suﬀered greatly due to the historical cir-
cumstances in which it was developed. The purpose of this section is to illustrate, based on historical
developments, the current status of property rights in the country, with special emphasis on land prop-
erty.
Nicaragua has known, since the early 1970s, three waves of land reform, signiﬁcantly altering the
property landscape:
• The land reform under the Somoza regime: although on paper a land reform, the main drive of
land policy under the regime of Anastasio Somoza was the extension of the agricultural frontier.
In fact a very large fraction of land given out during the 1970s was at the agricultural frontier
(towards the east of the country, gaining terrain on the tropical forest). Overall, however, the
Somoza regime, together with a series of commodity booms in coﬀee, cotton and meat, gave rise
to a process of land concentrations. The Somoza land reform had as one of its main objectives
to reduce the pressure on land in the fertile and more productive Paciﬁc strip of the country, in
order to ease the process of land concentration.
• Land reform under the Sandinista regime (1979 - 1990): After the overthrow of Somoza in 1979
the government distributed large tracts of land to former agricultural workers, organizing many
of them into collectivist cooperatives or state farms11. Towards the end of the period, and under
pressure due to the contra antirevolutionary war, the land reform started granting land to indi-
viduals or in cooperative regimes that permitted wider individual rights12. In 1988, 48% of the
country’s arable land was held under the various (individual, collective and state) forms of land
reform ownership according to Wheelock (1990).
• Following the change in government after the 1990 elections, two major events took place. On the
basis of peace agreements, the government continued redistributing land to ex-combatants (both
ex-contras and members of the downsized Sandinista army and security forces). This was largely
done under cooperative arrangements13 with the use of land bought purposefully and the inclusion
of ex-combatants as priority beneﬁciaries in the privatisation of large state farms, although overall
most of the land distribution was carried out in frontier areas. Secondly, the change of government
opened the door to a ﬂood of claims for restitution of land expropriated during the Sandinista
regime. This led to an enormous volume of litigation, much of which was not yet resolved at the
end of the 1990s and is one of the main causes of Nicaragua’s galloping internal debt.
The lack of proper legal documentation of land transfers, especially but not exclusively during the
Sandinista land reform, and the existence of allocations of plots over which the State had no legal right
have severely undermined the credibility and integrity of the property rights regime. This is illustrated
by two facts: the total surface area claimed for restitution in 2000 was larger than the total land area
of Nicaragua14 and the emergence of self-proclaimed ex-combatant bands (desmobilizados) who carried
11The production of commodities beneﬁting from larger returns to scale in production, such as sugarcane, coﬀee and
meat, was organised in large state conglomerates.
12An example of this were the cooperativas de surco muerto (dead furrow cooperatives) where the land was farmed
individually but no fences could be put up to signal the separation, in principle to allow for the use of machinery; the
unused furrows used to mark those limits gave the name to the cooperatives.
13An infamous example in Rio Blanco, where a cooperative was handed out to members of both groups, resulted in a
series of violent, even armed conﬂicts, for the control of land (Merlet and Pommier, 2000).
14See, for example, Merlet and Pommier (2000).
6out land invasions both in land redistributed during the Sandinista land reform and in privately held
land.
Finally, a great number of cooperatives created during the Sandinista period were de facto disbanded
and the property individualised. While there were about 3600 cooperatives registered at the end of
the Sandinista period, only 610 agricultural enterprises deﬁned themselves as cooperatives in 2000
(INEC, 2002). The inability to determine the rightful owners of the land and the requirements of
the legal and institutional setup to make the legal transition to individual property made it virtually
impossible for members of cooperatives to make this transition within the boundaries of the law.
The conjunction of unclear property claims due to the unsettled legal framework and the tightening of
the credit markets, mainly because of the tightening of the eligibility conditions for oﬃcial development
credit and then the disappearance of the oﬃcial development credit agency (BANADES), led to the
decline of the cooperative sector and a wave of distress sales (Jonakin, 1996).
As a result of the troubled history of land in Nicaragua, numerous types of documents proving
possession or property rights exist, with varying degrees of acceptability and legal backing. The most
relevant legal point is the importance of title registration under Nicaraguan law: only a title which is
registered can be used to prove property when faced with a claim by a third party, as only registration
ensures that conﬂicts with previous land owners have been settled or that a transfer has been properly
carried out. In the case of land reform beneﬁciaries, the legal mechanism requires that land be ﬁrst
acquired by the state (by payment of a compensation to the former owner) and only then titled in the
name of the land reform beneﬁciary.
Although a description of all the possible legal documents that can be used to prove ownership and
their legal support is beyond the scope of this paper, we can classify them as follows:
1. No title: a relatively large number of plots in Nicaragua (14% of the plots in our sample received
no document at all at the time of acquisition) are believed to have no written property title either
formal or informal;
2. Informal documents: usually in the form of a transfer deed that is not public (Carta de compra-
venta)o raC e r t i ﬁcate of possession (Constancia de posesión);
3. Transitory documents: administrative documents given out as part of the land reform process
(Constancia de asignación or Título provisional);
4. Supplementary titles: a special type of title issued from positive prescription that grants property
rights only so far as they are unopposed;
5. Agrarian reform titles: both during the Sandinista land reform and throughout most of the
1990s land regularization programme, these titles, which are administrative rather than judicial
documents, were given out. They carry a series of restrictions, most noticeably limitations on
validity if dated from the transition period (February-April 1990), and a ﬁve-year moratorium on
sales15;
6. Public deed: a well-deﬁned full property title documenting a land transaction.
Throughout the 1990s the government of Nicaragua, backed by a number of donors16, put emphasis
on land rights regularisation, especially of land aﬀected by the successive waves of land reform. The
scale of the programme is remarkable: between 1992 and 2002 the government of Nicaragua issued close
15Law 278 of 1997, the current legislation on land property rights, substantially relaxes this condition as it allows
mortgages on agrarian reform land as well as sales under certain conditions.
16Under the umbrella programme PNCTR (Programa Nacional de Catastro, Titulación y Registro - National Pro-
gramme of Cadastre, Titling and Registration) the government has carried out titling and land administration moderni-
sation initiatives.
7to 40,000 titles all over the country. While administrative records could include several titles given to
the same person or group of people, this can be compared to the nearly 200,000 farms counted in the
recent Agricultural Census (INEC, 2002).
Because the titling programme acts administratively rather than through the judicial system, the
type of title granted is an agrarian reform title (registered or unregistered) rather than a public deed
(which would be a notary’s document certifying a transfer17). From a legal point of view, this is the
consequence of the view that land is allocated and granted by the state rather than sold.
T h et y p eo fd o c u m e n th e l di so n eo ft h et w om a i ni n s t i t utional restrictions on registration. Informal
and transitory titles cannot be registered, except in special cases in which possession rights can be
registered18 and even then, only possession rights and rights over improvements will be registered. The
last three types of title can be registered as long as the chain of title is preserved19. Agrarian reform
titles are subject to a number of restrictions of validity and transactability, following the laws enacted
during the second half of the 1990s20 to protect property rights and to counteract abuses committed,
especially during the transition period.
Many agrarian reform titles need to be ratiﬁed and cannot be registered unless any previous conﬂict
has been resolved, and in particular unless any claim originating from pre-reform owners has been
settled. Because of this, even agrarian reform titles granted after 1991, which in theory need not be
ratiﬁed and for which the state should have carried out any necessary conﬂict resolution, are likely to
induce mistrust on the part of buyers and lenders especially if they are not registered. An important part
of the evaluation of the validity of the legal ediﬁce and the eﬀects of the titling intervention therefore
lies on the perceived diﬀerences between the two main types of full ownership documents.
T h es e c o n dr e s t r i c t i o no nr e g i s t r a t i o ni st h a te i t h e r no previous registration exists for the property
or that the title is a transfer deed from the previous owner. Because agrarian reform titles constitute
a transfer from the state, this implies that the state must have had ownership of the plot, which in
turn can be impeded by the existence of a restitution claim on the plot. Hence the resolution (or lack
thereof) of restitution or compensation claims by former owners whose lands were conﬁscated without
compensation and outside the prevailing legal framework during the land reform (generally known as
conﬁscados) or the coexistence of agrarian reform titles can impede registration.
While initially, reform beneﬁciaries received documentation short of a full registered title and were
expected to seek registration, the oﬃcial guidelines were changed mid-way into the process to eﬀectively
hand out only titles that had been properly registered21. In practice, many titles were given out
without having been properly registered ﬁrst even after this date, while some titles received prior to
this date had been registered. That guidelines were changed illustrates the importance of registration,
but we would not expect this change in regulation to be the only (or the major) source of variation
in registration status. However, due to the declarative nature of the Nicaraguan property registry,
this point is important in providing exogenous variation in registration status. If one could expect
well-established farmers to have taken action to register titles, the grant of already registered titles will
serve to identify the eﬀect of titling coupled with registration.
Finally, even when registration or titling is possible, the costs associated with either or both can be
substantial. A study of legalisation and registration costs (PAT-MAGFOR, 2001) found that indirect
17And therefore would entail buying land from the state.
18Possession rights can be registered via the use of a Supplementary Title. In the departments of Jinotega and Mata-
galpa, Public Registries also contain speciﬁc books to register possession rights, which are used to prove ownership on
improvements on land and can be used to prove length of possession.
19During the transition period between the February 1990 elections and the eﬀective change of government in April
1990, legislation was enacted that forced inscription even when the chain of title was not respected. The result of this
was to lower the security granted by registration of Agrarian reform titles altogether as many were registered without
preserving the chain of title and such registrations can, in principle, be challenged by previous owners or the State.
20Laws 209 and 278 require the revision of a substantial number of property titles and create mechanisms for automatic
devolution to the state of properties failing the revision process.
21Implementation of these guidelines seems however to have been hampered by shortages in staﬃng and funds.
8costs (transport, food, opportunity costs) can be of the order of magnitude of the monthly average
agricultural wage (approximately C$ 620)22 in remote areas . Legal costs are of the same order of
magnitude although they depend crucially on the type of title and are much higher when acquisition of
the title requires a court order, such as the supplementary title. The most important cost, however, is
at r a n s m i s s i o nt a xo f1% of the ﬁscal value of the land and any buildings or improvements23,w h i c hh a s
to be paid before registration or, in the case of bequests, before judicial execution of the will. Tying this
tax to registration signiﬁcantly increases the cost of registration for properties that have been bought or
inherited: the average land value in our sample is C$ 81,364, therefore this represents almost a twofold
increase in costs for land bought or inherited.
Despite its importance in property law, the Nicaraguan Property Registry is obsolete, severely
underfunded and mistrusted although great eﬀorts have been made since the change of power in 1992
to improve it (see Trackman, Fisher and Salas (1999) and Merlet and Pommier (2000) for details of
both the main problems faced by the Public Registry and recent improvements). This makes a test of
the importance of titling and registration all the more stringent in the case of Nicaragua as perceived
beneﬁts from titling and registration could very well be extremely low if there is distrust in either Land
Administration institutions or the judiciary.
2.3 Data sources and descriptive statistics
The main data source is the Estudio de las Dinámicas de la Economía Rural (Study of Rural Economy
Dynamics), a survey conducted by the World Bank, the University of Wisconsin and FIDEG, a local
NGO, between February and April 2000. This survey contains information on household characteristics
as well as information on income sources (both agricultural and non-agricultural), a detailed log of
land holdings and transactions and information on investments in land. The survey also has detailed
information on credit activity, including not only credit used but also denied requests and a subjective
self-assessment of creditworthiness24.
The sample for this survey was constructed using a 1996 nationally area-representative survey of
1360 farmers carried out by the Agriculture ministry (MAGFOR). This sample was then complemented
by three other categories: (i) 461 households drawn randomly from the list of beneﬁciaries of the govern-
mental titling programme, (ii) 372 rural households with little or no land, (iii) 282 of the households of
the original sample were no longer cultivating the plot they were cultivating in 1996 and were replaced
by the households who were farming the land at the time of the survey.
The presence of these categories ensures that the sample provides a representative picture of the
Nicaraguan agricultural landscape, and is representative at the level of the main agro-climatic regions:
the fertile Paciﬁc strip, the hilly Northern region and the Centre of the country25. The data covers
3212 plots distributed over 126 municipalities within 17 departments which can be grouped into 9 larger
regions.
However, the sub-samples do not share the same structure below the macro-regional level, with
categories (i) and (ii) being stratiﬁed further at the departmental level. Further details on how the
samples were constructed can be found in the appendix.
Tables (A1) and (A2) (also in the appendix) present household and plot level summary statistics
for the sample and each of the sub-samples. It can be seen that the sub-samples are markedly diﬀerent
not only in terms of land holdings but also in the form of land ownership as well as land use: while
most land held by titling programme beneﬁciaries is used for seasonal crops, well-established farmers
and land buyers devote a large proportion of land to pastures. On average, well-established farmers
and land buyers are richer than the other two groups and titling program beneﬁciaries are richer than
221 córdoba (C$) = 13.5 US$ approx. at the time of the survey.
23This tax has since been raised to 4%.
24i.e.: the answer to the question “whould you have been granted credit had you requested it”.
25T h eA t l a n t i cr e g i o n sa r en o tr e p r e s e n t e dd u et ot h ed i ﬃculty of access and low population density.
9the land poor. However the wealth of the ﬁrst two groups is held in notably diﬀerent ways. While
established farmers hold higher value machinery and cattle, land buyers hold more land and are more
heavily indebted. Several explanations could account for this: many purchases may have been made for
extensive cattle farming, which requires less agricultural machinery but substantial initial investment.
Another possibility is that the lack of depth of the land mortgage market even for relatively well-oﬀ
households pushes them to ﬁnance the land purchases at least in part by selling or not buying mobile
capital assets26 as in the mechanism proposed by Carter and Olinto (2003).
Table [1] presents summary statistics on plot-level tenure types. Over 10% of the sample has no title
or a very insecure type of title (the ﬁrst four categories). Public deeds are the most common type of
title, held for 58% of the plots, while about 30% of the sample plots are held with agrarian reform titles.
While the categories do not exactly match, recent data from the National Agricultural Census ﬁnd
that 56% of land owned is held with public deeds and only 10% with agrarian reform titles, although a
further 18% are reported as “owners without a public deed” and 15% as “in legalisation process”, both
of which would include a number of agrarian reform titles. The lack of tenure security and the diversity
of tenure regimes are quantitatively large problems in Nicaragua.
Table [2] presents summary data on the investments considered. These are land-attached investments
such as sheds, silos, stables, wells and processing facilities (in particular coﬀee processing facilities).
The main dependent variable of interest is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if any of these
investments was carried out between 1996 and 1999. We also form groups of investments according to
whether they are speciﬁc to cattle farming or not. This table shows that these investments, while large
and relatively capital intensive, are not reserved for a wealthy minority, as they existed in a third of plots
sampled at the time of the survey, and the dependent variable mean (the proportion of plots invested in
during the period of interest) is 0.11. Two main considerations directed the choice of investments to be
included. The ﬁrst one is due to limitations of the data: for these investments, we have data on stocks
in 1990, 1996 and 1999. For other types of investment, such as fences, terraces and manure applications
which have also been examined in the literature, we can only know when investment last took place.
Because those types of investment require substantial reinvestment, the lack of data on stocks would be
a hindrance. The second consideration is that, because we do not observe the cost of the investment in
labour or capital, we are forced to aggregate investments that are potentially very diﬀerent. The class
of investments chosen, namely production buildings, share basic physical characteristics and all require
substantial capital. While concerns still arise from pooling investments of varying costs, we expect this
to reduce the potential impact of outliers in the data. Finally, while we have data on 1990 stocks, we
choose investment between 1996 and 1999 because by 1996, 77% of property documents for which we
have a date of emission were already emitted, while that ﬁgure is only 46% for 1990, not surprisingly
given the large titling eﬀort.
3 Basic results
We begin by analysing the direct eﬀect of property documents on investment. We consider the following
general speciﬁcation:
Ip,h,t − Ip,h,t−1 = α + βXp,h,t + γZp,h + δHh,t + εp,h,t (1)
Where I represents investments present in plot p owned by household h at time t,t h eX’s are plot
level variables representing tenure status at time t,t h eZ’s are other plot characteristics, and the H’s
are household level variables.
26Finally, measurement error in the machinery value variable cannot be ruled out. The absence of detailed price data
means that machinery quality and depreciation are not accounted for. This could entail a signiﬁcant overvaluation of
longer-serving machinery.
10Because the investments considered are immobile long-term investments, security of tenure, insofar
as it determines the horizon of the producer, is a key determinant of their expected return.
The dependent variables of interest are dummy variables for each of the types of document in the
sample. The ﬁrst three — possessory note or certiﬁcate (constancia de asignación / posesión), private
sale document (carta de compra/venta) and provisional title — are not suﬃcient to prove ownership
rights but can be used to prove possession, while the remaining documents are property documents:
public deeds (escritura pública) and agrarian reform titles are full property documents that can be
registered provided the title is deemed acceptable and no conﬂicting registry entry exists. Communal
and indigenous titles are speciﬁc to indigenous communities and are in principle full property documents.
Supplementary titles and most judicial documents (these include court orders, will executions and
powers of attorney) are full property documents in that they document ownership but are subject to
limitations with respect to either registration or the protection oﬀered by registration. The omitted
category is “no document”. A dummy variable representing the registration status is also added. All
legal status data is contemporaneous (2000) data.
We use a linear speciﬁcation for ease of interpretation of the coeﬃcients, in particular for comparison
with subsequent speciﬁcations where household ﬁxed eﬀects are used27. In anticipation of the potential
omitted variables problem, we adopt, throughout this section, a sparse-to-saturated approach to model
selection, with each set of regressions testing for the importance of a particular aspect of land ownership.
Table [3] presents results of linear regressions of this speciﬁcation stripped down to the bare essen-
tials, including only property document data and registration status. A preliminary regression (not
reported) of investment on title types only shows no association between the type of title and the in-
vestment variable. Column (1) presents the basic speciﬁcation with only document type and status
dummies, while columns (2) and (3) add respectively regional and municipal ﬁxed eﬀects. Errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipal level for all but column (1) and for the re-
mainder of the paper. Errors are in fact likely toexhibit heteroskedasticity and to be correlated within
municipalities due, on the one hand, to the diﬀering size of areas covered by municipalities, and on the
other hand to non-linear eﬀects of unobserved institutional factors that would leave a common residue
in the error term.
Only the coeﬃcient on registration status is signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in all speciﬁcations,
and the order of magnitude of the coeﬃcient is robust to the inclusion of municipal ﬁxed eﬀects (which to
a certain extent will capture major diﬀerences in land use and land quality, as well as local institutions).
The slight increase in the point estimate of the coeﬃcient is indicative of the fact that the original result
is not led by large diﬀerences in registration that can be attributed to recent settlement or average land
quality. The size of the coeﬃcient (0.043) is remarkable given that the average of the dependent variable
is only 0.12, so registration is associated with an increase in the probability to invest of over one third
(35%) of the average sample probability.
Of the remaining coeﬃcients, the large negative coeﬃcient on indigenous titles in noteworthy. Both
communal and indigenous titles in the sample are concentrated in the provinces of Leon and Madriz,
an area where indigenous community property is known to be conﬂictual. However, there are very few
such observations in the data set and we cannot conﬁrm or inﬁrm this from the results.
Column (4) replaces the registration dummy with interactions of registration with each of the docu-
ments that can be registered28.O n l yt h ec o e ﬃcients on registered public deeds and registered agrarian
reform titles are signiﬁcant among these, and only these are shown. They are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other (the P-value of a Wald test of equality is 0.61), and they have the same magnitude
as the registration variable. Therefore we conclude that legal status does matter for investment but
27A probit regression would be problematic in the inclusion of the ﬁxed eﬀects. Marginal eﬀects from results of logistic
regressions are very similar for the main dependent variables in the basic speciﬁcations.
28Some registries do accept to include possessory documents in the registry in a separate book and there may be instances
where plots are registered in the neighbouring department because of this, however the corresponding interaction terms
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional conﬁdence levels if included.
11only insofar as the titles are registered and that the speciﬁc type of title is not a major determinant of
investment.
The failure to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two main types of strong property doc-
uments, especially in their unregistered version, is somewhat surprising as we had expected to ﬁnd
ad i ﬀerent eﬀect of agrarian reform documents, generally thought of as being less reliable due to the
process leading to their acquisition, and because of the restrictions on alienation they carry. More
speciﬁcally, if land acquired through land reform interventions is less secure, we would expect the coef-
ﬁcient to be smaller — at least the uninteracted term and probably the interacted term as well — as the
eﬀect of title on security is smaller29.
Because of the legal diﬀerences in the treatment of agrarian reform titles depending on whether they
were granted before or after the political transition in 1990, table [4] examines the eﬀect of acquiring land
or documents after 1990. Columns (1) and (2) examine the impact of document dates; (1) includes a
dummy variable for whether the document was received after 1990 and its interaction with the agrarian
reform title dummy while (2) adds to that speciﬁcation the length of continued possession in years. The
results do not support a diﬀerence between documents even when considering the date. While reception
of a document after 1990 is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in column (1) and has a large coeﬃcient, this eﬀect
is captured by length of possession so that there is no evidence that documents received after 1990 are
special nor that reform documents received after 1990 are special30. Some document dummies become
marginally signiﬁcant in columns (1) and (2) due to the correlation between the date of reception and
the document type created by the titling programme, the bulk of whose actions were carried out after
1992.
Given the many missing values in the data for land title dates, columns (3) and (4) examine the
impact of the date of acquisition of the plot. We again use 1990 as a possible threshold date due to the
possible legal hurdles that acquisition before 1990 creates for legal tenure security and the recognition
of ownership. Column (3) includes length of possession, a dummy for whether the plot was acquired
through land reform, a dummy variable indicating access to the plot after 1990 and the interaction of
the latter two variables. We ﬁnd acquisition after 1990 to be signiﬁcant at the 10% level even when
controlling for length of possession, but not more so for land reform acquired plots31. We therefore drop
the interaction term and the reform acquisition variable32. Finally, column (4) conﬁrms the importance
of having acquired land after 1990. The positive sign of this coeﬃcient indicates that this is a security-
related eﬀect rather than an eﬀect due to the length of possession (which would lead to a negative
coeﬃcient, as the investments considered are very durable).
Results from tables [3] and [4] suggest that, insofar as legal documents have an eﬀect through either
the provision of tenure security or the availability of formal credit, that eﬀect is entirely borne by the
registration status of the title. The fact that only registration matters is in accord with the law, which
states that only registered titles oﬀer full protection against a third party claim over land ownership.
Moreover, mortgages on land need to be registered and therefore formal credit can only use land as
legally backed collateral if that land is previously registered.
Table [5] presents results of the full speciﬁcation. Due to the ﬁn d i n gt h a tt h et y p eo fd o c u m e n t
is not statistically signiﬁcant once registration is controlled for, the type of document dummies are
omitted. Column (1) adds further plot level controls which are inherent plot characteristics (area, area
squared, distance from the household’s dwelling, total investment in 1990 and a set of dummy variables
29Unless it is insecurity that causes investment, which we can not rule out at this stage, in which case we would expect
al a r g e rc o e ﬃcient as less security prompts more investment.
30There is a substantial drop in the number of observations in columns (1) and (2) of table [4] due to many missing
values in the date of document variable even for documents which by their formal essence, are necessarily dated.
31The land reform acquisition variable is closely related to some of the document types (provisional titles and agrarian
reform titles in particular) but a joint Wald test of signiﬁcance cannot reject their joint irrelevance (P-value =0 .73).
32A further regression (not reported) with the reform access variable but without the interaction also shows the former to
have a coeﬃcient that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, both on its own and jointly with the ones for reform-speciﬁc
title types.
12for diﬀerent types of topography). Column (2) adds household controls including dummy variables for
the sub-sample the household belongs to33, the age of the head of household and its square, an indicator
variable for female-headed households, the education of the household head, the number of males and
females over 1234 and the presence of at least one literate person in the household. Column (3) adds
distance to the nearest paved road and distance to the nearest wholesaler as measures of infrastructure
quality and of the geographical isolation of the household35. Finally, column (4) adds a set of household
wealth controls (agricultural machinery owned in 1990, ownership of a television or radio in 1996, an
indicator variable for whether the household dwelling has an earth or soil ﬂoor and the total are of
agricultural land owned by the parents of the household head at the time the household head started
working on his own account). Column (4) is our main speciﬁcation and a more detailed description of
the variables used can be found in table [B3] in the appendix.
The addition of these controls does not signiﬁcantly alter the coeﬃcient of interest, which remains
between 4% and 5% in magnitude and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Noteworthy coeﬃcients on controls
include the lack of signiﬁcance of initial investment which we would expect to be negative due to
decreasing returns to investment, and that of distance to the plot. A plot which is further away
is harder to keep watch on, although the nature of the investments considered makes them hard to
steal or damage, which may be the reason for the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. Other coeﬃcients have the
expected signs with the exception of the (insigniﬁcant) coeﬃcients for household composition variables:
inve stment is more likely in larger pl ots (alb eit l ess than linearl y so), m ore likely t o b e c arried out by
a household sampled in the follow-up sample36, and less likely the further a household is from a paved
road. This last point seems to be closely related to later acquisition of land as the coeﬃcient on post-
1990 acquisition of land loses signiﬁcance in column (3). This can be attributed to the distribution of
land in the agricultural frontier to ex-combatants as part of the peace aggreements (Agu-Lughod, 2000).
Of the wealth controls, only TV ownership has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient37 which is somewhat surprising.
The great mobility in land ownership in Nicaragua as a result of the successive waves of land reform
implies that parental ownership of land is not a very good predictor of current ownership of land, which
can account for the lack of explanatory power of this variable.
Our basic results show that having a formal ownership document that is registered is strongly linked
with the propensity to invest38. Moreover, this result is robust to the inclusion of a whole range of
controls that co-determine the returns on investment in land. We now turn to testing the robustness of
these ﬁndings.
4 Econometric concerns
This section deals with econometric issues that may limit the validity of the estimates presented in
section 3. We will ﬁrst present the main issues regarding measurement issues and the possibility of
relevant omitted variables, move then to unobservable household heterogeneity and then turn to the
problem of possible endogeneity of the main dependent variable.
33Terms interacting the subsample dummy with registration status were also entered but found to be insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero and are omitted in the speciﬁcation presented.
34Age 12 is chosen as it is the age a child would reach at the end of primary education without repeating a year. It is
also the lowest age at which signiﬁcant labour activity is reported.
35Unfortunately, the smallest identiﬁable geographical divisions are municipalities, which are too large for ﬁxed eﬀects
to fully control for infrastructure quantity or quality.
36The follow-up subsample households are richer, especially in cattle and land, and have acquired land in later years.
Excluding these households does not change the coeﬃcient on registration but weakens the coeﬃcient on post-1990 access
to land.
37The large size of this coeﬃcient is probably due to threshold eﬀects in wealth.
38In fact, adding document type dummy variables to the baseline speciﬁcation does not signiﬁcantly alter the results,
moreover, we are still unable to reject that the eﬀects of having a registered public deed and a registered agrarian reform
document are the same (regressions not reported).
134.1 Omitted variables and unobserved characteristics
4.1.1 Controls for wealth
Because the investments considered can require substantial capital and we have argued that registration
in some cases can also entail signiﬁcant expenditure, the lack of signiﬁcance and the small changes in
the coeﬃcient of interest after the inclusion of controls for household wealth to the baseline speciﬁcation
pose a problem. So far, the possibility that both registration and investment are driven by household
wealth cannot be ruled out.
Table [6] tries to address this problem by adding a ﬁnal set of controls for household wealth. Un-
fortunately, we have limited information on wealth other than land at other points in time, therefore
columns (1) and (2) test two diﬀerent sets of wealth controls: column (1), our baseline speciﬁcation,
includes only those variables that are available for a time prior to the starting point for our investment
variable and substitutes own area in 1990 by the area owned by the parents at the time of emanci-
pation. Column (2) includes as much information on current wealth as is available, lagged if possible
and contemporaneous otherwise (agricultural machinery, television and radio ownership, ownership of
non-agricultural land, cattle value, non-agricultural capital, own area in 1990 and an indicator variable
for whether the household dwelling has an earth ﬂoor). We treat this table not so much as a test for the
best set of covariates but as a test of whether registration could be found to be driving investment only
because it is related to wealth. In which case we would observe a drop in the value of the coeﬃcient on
the registration variable when further controls for wealth are included as well as in its signiﬁcance.
While the values of cattle and non-agricultural capital as well as the variable for total owned area
have large and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, the coeﬃcient of interest is not much aﬀected. Had the measured
eﬀect been due to mismeasurement of wealth, we would expect to see a much greater change in the
coeﬃcient on registration.
Given the relatively small change in the coeﬃcient, we prefer our baseline allocation, as contempora-
neous wealth variables are clearly very likely to be endogenous to the investment decision and therefore
likely to have biased coeﬃcients and to bias other coeﬃcients in the regression. It not unlikely that
investment drives wealth or the allocation of wealth. Even in the most favourable case, we would expect
the distribution of wealth between land-attached investment and other forms to be jointly determined
with the level of land-attached investment.
With the preceding caveat, it is noteworthy that the coeﬃcient on the value of cattle is much larger
than that on other forms of asset ownership. While this could be due to the fact that cattle is often used
in rural Nicaragua as a store of wealth, we also interpret it as a warning with regard to the measurement
of the dependent variable, which puts more emphasis on cattle-related investment.
4.1.2 Controlling for main land use
We have very little information on the quality of land, which could be related to the expected return on
investment and thereby to the propensity to invest. In particular, we decided not to include information
about the main use of land (for seasonal, perennial crops or pastures) as, while it could provide some
information about the inherent productivity of land, the decision is likely to be endogenous.
As a robustness check, the regressions reported in table [7] run the baseline speciﬁcation on diﬀerent
sub-samples according to the main use of land as reported by the household39.A r e p o r t e d u s e o f
“seasonal crops” is compatible with the existence of cattle or permanent crops, and we therefore use the
same deﬁnition of the dependent variable. However, in the case of perennial crops and pastures, this is
less likely, and we therefore run the baseline speciﬁcation for cattle-speciﬁc improvements (cattle sheds,
forrage silos, etc) in the case of pastures and non-cattle speciﬁc improvements in the case of perennial
cultures.
39As it is common practice in Nicaragua to associate perennial cultures (particularly coﬀee and fruit) with seasonal
cultures (typically maize and beans), the classiﬁcation may be somwhat imprecise.
14Hence, columns (1), (2) and (3) report the baseline regression for plots with seasonal crops, perennials
and pastures respectively, while column (4) reports results for non cattle-speciﬁci m p r o v e m e n t si np l o t s
with perennial crops and column (5) reports results for cattle-speciﬁc investments in pasture plots.
The main results are unchanged, although they are much weaker in the case of perennial cultures.
One reason for this is the fact that the main non cattle-speciﬁc investments (silos, irrigation) are
less likely to be useful for the most common perennial crops (coﬀee and fruit) while coﬀee-speciﬁc
installations need not be on the same plot as the coﬀee trees. However, even in the case of perennial
crops, registration status remains signiﬁcant and the point estimate stable.
4.1.3 Cattle-speciﬁc investments
A concern arising from our earlier robustness checks for the importance of wealth controls is that we
may be capturing mostly an eﬀect of investment in cattle-related installations, and therefore a greater
propensity of cattle farmers to register their land. One possible cause of this is the fact that most cattle
farming in Nicaragua is extensive, therefore making it more costly to watch over the land when the
cattle herd is elsewhere.
T oa l l e v i a t et h i sc o n c e r n ,w es p l i tt h es a m p l ei nt wo sub-samples according to whether the household
owns any cattle or not, and we regress separately non cattle-speciﬁc investments for households with
no cattle (column 1) and cattle-speciﬁc investments for households with cattle (column 2), as well as
for the whole sample (in column 3, for comparison purposes).
The results are encouraging. While we do ﬁnd that part of the results are carried by cattle-speciﬁc
investments, as shown by the strong coeﬃcient for registration in column 2, the results of column 1
show that registration also matters for non cattle-speciﬁc investment. In fact, the coeﬃcients are of very
similar magnitude, suggesting that registration matters equally for the relevant investment regardless
of whether it is cattle related or not40.
4.2 Unobserved household heterogeneity
The main concern in estimation of (1) is the existence of unobservable household level variables — such as
entrepreneurship or legal sophistication, or better measures of wealth or income — that are not included
in the estimated regression but may be correlated with both registration status and the decision to
invest. Failure to include them will make the estimates inconsistent. For this reason we run the same
speciﬁcation with the inclusion of household ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimated equation is therefore:
Ip,h,t − Ip,h,t−1 = βXp,h,t + γZp,h + αh + εp,h,t (2)
The inclusion of household ﬁxed eﬀects means that the estimation relies exclusively on within-
household variation. For this reason, only households with more than one plot of land are included41.
It should be noted that this has the eﬀect of reducing variation in the data because fewer plots are
considered and only within-household variation is taken into account; moreover, the equation is now es-
timated for households owning more than one plot only, which may systematically diﬀer from households
with only one plot.
Table [9] summarises the amount of within-household variation in both the dependent variable and
the main independent variable. This constitutes a stiﬀ test of the association between registration
and investment. While our sample only drops to 1916 plots, there is within-household variation in
registration for 691 of them, variation in investment for 454 of them, and only 52 households (176 plots)
have variation in both investment and registration. On top of this, plots owned by households with
40Not surprisingly, a regression of cattle-related investments for households with no cattle does not provide any useful
information (not reported).
41The inclusion of all households would, of course, not alter parameter estimates. It would, however, alter the variance
estimates, given that these allow for clustering at the municipality level.
15more than one plot are 3 percentage points less likely to receive investment (signiﬁcant at the 1% level)
and 5 percentage points less likely to be registered.
If a household owns several plots, the presence of household ﬁxed eﬀects dilutes the credit eﬀect
mentioned above. Indeed, if the credit eﬀect is the force driving an increase in investment, then own
plot characteristics will also matter insofar as they enhance the household creditworthiness. However, if
the increase in investment can be attributed to household-level eﬀects, such as an increase in available
resources (funds and/or time) which are then invested equally among plots, we would not expect to ﬁnd
an eﬀect in this speciﬁcation (Besley, 1995). Finding an eﬀect in this speciﬁcation does not preclude
the existence of a credit eﬀect, it would only indicate how the extra available funds are allocated.
Results are reported in table [10] along with the full speciﬁcation (1) ran over the same households,
for comparison purposes (in column (1)). Column (2) uses the same sample as column (1), while
columns (3) and (4) use the full sample of households with more than one plot42. The point estimate of
the coeﬃcient of interest increases slightly but the coeﬃcient is less precisely estimated. The statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient is reduced, especially when we allow for correlation between errors within
municipalities, although it remains signiﬁcant at the 10% level throughout.
Overall, results from this speciﬁcation are somewhat supportive of the basic results. The inclusion
of household ﬁxed eﬀects captures much of the variation in the dependent variable as showed by the R2
of the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions (R2 =0 .47), suggesting that household eﬀects not present in the original
model are important in the investment decision.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h el a c ko fs i g n i ﬁcance of the included regressors points to the fact that important
determinants of investment at the plot level (in particular a measure of the quality of land) are not
included, which casts some doubts on the validity of the estimates. Column (4) includes variables
describing the mode of access to the plot and ﬁnds that within a household, receipt of a plot via land
reform makes it substantially less likely to receive investment, although this eﬀect is cancelled out by a
registered title; having bought the plot, however, makes it no more or less likely to receive investment
than having inherited it (the omitted category).
4.3 Endogeneity
While household the household ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation can control for any unobserved household
characteristic that aﬀects all plots in the same way, there is still the possibility that registration is
endogenous, in the sense that it is correlated with the error of the regression. We now turn to concerns
about the endogeneity of legal ownership documents, and registration in particular.
Endogeneity of land property rights is a matter that was largely ignored in the literature dealing
with investment eﬀects of tenure security until the work of Besley (1995). The main argument is that
past investments may enhance land tenure security; if land holders own the improvements they make
on land, they may claim to own the land by virtue of this. This argument relates to the essence of
property rights themselves, by relying on the idea that individuals create property rights by “mixing”
their labour with a given object. Moreover, such rights are legally recognised in many countries — at
least to some extent — including Nicaragua.
In eﬀect, adverse possession can be used as the basis for prescription of the owner’s property rights
and therefore as a means of access to property rights which are formally recognised (a mechanism known
as “positive prescription” in Nicaraguan law). In turn, visible investments in land could be used to
prove possession itself and therefore be used as a basis to obtain formal property rights. There are two
distinct reasons why this mechanism, in our opinion, is not a major concern. Firstly, despite widespread
speculation in Nicaraguan media of the massive use (and misuse) of positive prescription, the type of
title which sanctions it is hardly present in our data set43. Secondly, the time frame involved in the
42The diﬀerence between the samples is the existence of missing data which would exclude some households from the
baseline speciﬁcation.
43Land held with a título supletorio (supplementary title) represents less than 1% of the plots in the sample.
16judicial mechanism (10 years’ continued possession) is considerably larger than the one we examine
(investment within 3 years of the survey). Because of these two facts, we are relatively safe from such
reverse causation concerns.
Unfortunately, this does not mean that we are free from endogeneity concerns altogether. Beneﬁcia-
ries of the governmental titling programme may have received titles that were registered or unregistered,
with registration depending on a number of factors which are largely exogenous to the household’s in-
vestment decision, such as the presence of an unsettled claim from a previous owner or administrative
competence on the part of the titling oﬃcer. However, the nature of the registry is declarative, which
means that, in general, registration is a decision of the household. This means that households that
received a title that could be registered but was not, may have decided to register it later and even that
an individual may obtain a title so as to register his or her property rights.
In the case of plots which were inherited or bought, registering the transfer deed (in the latter case)
or updating registry information (in the former) is solely a decision of the household and is likely to be
led by the relative costs and beneﬁts provided by registration, including any anticipated increase in the
expected return on investment.
A ﬁrst answer to this is to carry out the main regression only for the plots participating in the
legalisation process44, as there is likely to be substantial variation in registration at the reception of the
document due to factors that are exogenous to the household’s decision. This is done in Table [11]. The
main independent variable is also changed to be not current registration, which is potentially endoge-
nous, but a dummy indicating whether the plot was registered at the time it was titled (self-reported).
This variable potentially depends on the speciﬁc procedures put in place by the programme at the time
and therefore exogenous to the investment decision. Both the baseline speciﬁcation with household
controls and a household ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation are presented and results are mildly supportive of
our basic speciﬁcation, although the drop in sample size is very large, especially in the case of the ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcation.
Moreover, using correct registration at receipt of title as an instrument for current registration
results in a coeﬃcient that is of roughly the same magnitude (0.074) but no longer signiﬁcant (P-value
= 0.18), despite the strong ﬁrst stage regression (the t-statistic for the excluded instrument is 13.18
even with municipal ﬁxed eﬀects). Overall, restricting attention to titling beneﬁciaries has the eﬀect of
reducing the variation in the sample and weakens the results.
The contamination of the registration status can be addressed if we believe that the type of title is
exogenous to the investment decision. Because only certain types of title can be registered, the type of
document held is an important predictor of the registration decision. Moreover, as per our discussion
in section 2, the type of title, and more generally the tenure status (especially whether the owner is a
land reform beneﬁciary or not) are crucial determinants of not only the possibility of registration, but
its cost when it is possible. However, since what brings about investment is not so much the title itself
but whether this title is registered, as suggested by the basic results presented above, document types
are natural instruments for registration status in the investment equation.
Which document is held depends essentially on the tenure of land before it was acquired and on how
it was acquired. Land reform beneﬁciaries receive land reform titles or provisional titles if the legality
of the land allocation has not yet been veriﬁed. Inherited land retains the original document, although
if that is an informal document, steps can be taken to acquire a public deed. If land is bought, the
original type of document is also retained, although it is less likely to be an agrarian reform title due
to limitations on its sale.
Because registration is declarative, we are particularly concerned with the endogeneity of the regis-
tration decision. However, it is also possible for the document held to be endogenous itself, particularly
in the case of land reform beneﬁciaries. Indeed, the titling programme was carried out “on demand”
44We do not have, unfortunately, an indicator of participation from the sampling stages and we have to rely on self-
reported data, which may not always be accurate.
17rather than universally. The fact that the unit of titling was not the individual plot but rather the
original estate (usually much larger than a single plot), there is the possibility that someone not ac-
tively seeking a title would receive one. However, the possibility of actively seeking a title poses a
major problem. For this reason, we will use two alternative sets of instruments: current documents
held and the documents held for the plots at the time of acquisition. Because this does not allow us
to distinguish ex-ante between possible titling beneﬁciaries and other producers, we augment this set
by the interaction of not having a title with the mode of access to land (inherited, bought, squatted,
received as donation, received through land reform)
The relevant estimator for comparison with the results presented above is the “within” instrumental
variables estimator. However, this will only control for local eﬀects which are ﬁxed and additive in
nature. In order to make correct inference in the presence of potential correlation between errors at the
local level, we present the results with standard errors corrected for clustering at the municipal level.
The orthogonality conditions on the instruments are tested using the J statistic of Hansen (1982)45.
4.3.1 Determinants of registration
As a ﬁrst attempt to model the decision to register a title, we run regressions of registration status on a
number of plot and household characteristics, including type of title, as well as geographic (municipal)
dummies. This corresponds to the “ﬁrst stage” regression of the instrumental variables estimator if it
is viewed as a two-stage least squares estimator46.
For comparison purposes, we also present results from a regression omitting document type but
including dummies for the mode of access, as used, among others, by Besley (1995): the categories are
inheritance (omitted), purchase, squatting, donation and land reform. Results are presented in Table
[12]. All regressions share the same set of covariates of the baseline speciﬁcation.
Regarding the mode of acquisition, registration is more likely if the plot was bought, inherited or
acquired through land reform and less likely if it was acquired through donation or squatted47.O v e r a l l
mode of access is not a very good predictor of registration (the R-squared — including municipal dummies
— is 0.25). One reason for this is that what matters is the level of formalisation. For example a sale can
be carried out privately or publicly and this will lead to diﬀerent transfer deeds which impacts on the
possibility of registration.
Results regarding title type are as expected: registration is more likely with a public deed than with
any other type of title, including an agrarian reform title (the diﬀerence is quantitatively important and
signiﬁcant at better than the 1% level), then with agrarian reform titles (either provisional of deﬁnitive)
and ﬁnally with other types of title48. On the whole, agrarian reform beneﬁciaries are less likely to
register their rights than are recent buyers.
Surprisingly, apart from plot area, factors that inﬂuence the value of the land such as topography,
and that we could therefore expect to increase demand for registration, do not increase the probability
of registration status49. A greater degree of literacy or education increases the chances of registration,
which is a relatively heavy bureaucratic process, and so does being close to a market. This is taken
as evidence that the opportunity cost of carrying out the procedure is relevant, if we assume that the
distance to the local market or wholesaler is indicative of the distance to government institutions.
45The J statistic is numerically identical to the Sargan statistic under conditional homoskedasticity but the latter is
not valid for an IV regression if this assumption is violated, see Baum, Schaﬀer and Stillman (2003).
46In the presence of heteroskedasticity the 2SLS estimator is less eﬃcient (asymptotically) than its GMM counterpart,
which takes into account the structure of the variance-covariance matrix in estimation, rather than just in the calculation
of standard errors.
47The “other” category includes especially non-legalised donations and cooperatives. Donations are the legal ﬁgure of
choice for dismembering cooperatives as they do not require a transaction and reduce legal costs.
48Indigenous community titles are excluded in these regressions.
49The inclusion of land-use dummies shows that land used for perennial cultures is more likely to be registered. However
these variables are very likely to be endogenous and are omitted.
18Finally, wealth variables are not strong determinants of registration status and are therefore not
reported. An optimistic interpretation of this ﬁnding would be that wealth constraints are not binding
in registering titles once the cost of acquiring the title is taken into account. However this may also
be a consequence of either the imperfect measurement of wealth, as most measures are self-reported,
or of the fact that, since the cost of registration is for a large part ﬁxed, wealth constraints are only
important for lower income households, making the actual relationship non-linear, which would result
in an underestimation of the importance of wealth.
From the perspective of the instrumental variable estimation of the investment equation, document
types are important predictors of registration, and, subject to their conforming to the orthogonality
conditions, appear to be good instrument candidates.
Results concerning individual documents are similar when we consider documents at acquisition,
with the exception of agrarian reform titles. The eﬀect of the titling and registration programme was
expected to show on the interaction terms since having no title but being an agrarian reform beneﬁciary
should make the individual eligible for titling, this in turn should facilitate registration. The lack of
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on that term casts some doubts on the power of our preferred instrument
set to eﬀectively predict programme participation and, therefore, title change. Overall, the ﬁrst stage
with the second set of instruments is much weaker than with current documents.
4.3.2 Instrumental variables estimates
Table [13] reports instrumental variables estimates of the investment equation for the ﬁrst set of instru-
ments. All estimates in this table are of the mean-diﬀerenced model (with means taken at the municipal
level) and are therefore within municipality estimators.
Because our instruments are dummy variables, the instrumental variables estimates rely on the
variation between the groups described by the instruments50. We view our instruments as essentially
determining the cost of registration for a given net beneﬁt from investment. The coeﬃcient therefore
measures the impact of opportunity to register and is identiﬁed by variation between holders of diﬀerent
documents.
If, for every type of document, the decision to register depended on the prospect of future (or
current) investment, the coeﬃcient from the instrumental variable estimation would be lower than the
OLS coeﬃcient.
Column (1) reports the OLS results, while column (2) reports two-stage least squares results, column
(3) reports 2SLS results with robust variance-covariance and column (4) reports the asymptotically
eﬃcient cluster-heteroskedasticity consistent GMM estimator.
The instruments are found to be orthogonal to estimation errors as we can never reject the null in
a test of overidentifying restrictions even when taking into account potential error correlations within
municipalities. Overall results are not greatly aﬀected by instrumenting and the point estimate is
actually larger. In fact a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test between the estimates in columns (1) and (2)
cannot reject exogeneity of the registration variable, or in other words, reject that the OLS speciﬁcation
is correct, and therefore, more eﬃcient. The eﬀect of registration is therefore estimated to be of the
order of 5% according to the ﬁrst set of instruments.
Results for the alternative set of instruments are presented in table [14]. Results are somewhat
mixed, as only the last estimator ﬁnds a signiﬁcant eﬀect of registration51. The point estimate is not
aﬀected, but the coeﬃcient is not precisely estimated and is not found to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
50It is indeed an eﬃcient linear combination of pairwise between estimator, as pointed out, for example, by Angrist
(1991)
51This estimator suﬀers from potential problems because it involves municipal mean-diﬀerencing, along with the use of
an estimated clustered variance-covariance matrix at the same level to form the weighting matrix.
19T h el a c ko fe x p l a n a t o r yp o w e ro ft h es e c o n ds e to fi n s t r u m e n t si nt h eﬁrst stage is probably the cause
of the lack of signiﬁcance of these results. However, the diﬀerence between the two sets of instruments
suggests that while current documents contain much of the information about tenure status that makes
registration matter for the investment regression, this information is not contained in the tenure status
at access. This means that we should exert care not to consider tenure regime or security as ﬁxed or
predetermined.
There remains one caveat about the estimates presented that cannot be easily lifted with the results
p r e s e n t e d . W h i l ew eh a v em a d ee v e r ye ﬀort to estimate the eﬀect of registration taking into account
the possible endogeneity of the titling or registration decision, our estimates rely on the randomness of
the distribution of titles with respect to plot-level unobservable characteristics.
4.3.3 Matching estimates of the eﬀects of registration
The structure of the data (see appendix A) lends itself to the treatment of the titling programme and
subsequent registration with the use of a control group. While the titling sub-sample was selected among
beneﬁciaries, the particular political objectives of the programme meant that plots with insecure tenure
may not have received titles, in particular of households who had not beneﬁted from the land reform
and which, while they were originally intended to beneﬁt from the titling programme, were in practice
excluded from it for the larger part due to procedural problems.
Table [15] provides propensity score matching estimates of the association between registration and
investment. The matching method is kernel matching, and the propensity score is calculated with
the covariates used for the baseline model, as well as for these augmented by the set of documents at
acquisition of land and the mode of access to land for those plots not having a document at the time
of acquisition. Estimates are presented for both models with and without municipal ﬁxed eﬀects in the
propensity score function. The pseudo-R squared from the estimation of the propensity to register is
reported as a measure of goodness of ﬁt, and bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals are reported.
The estimated average eﬀects of the ‘treatment’ (registration) on the treated are consistent with our
ﬁndings in parametric speciﬁcations, and actually lie on the upper end of the range described by the
coeﬃcient during the robustness tests.
Matching estimates of the eﬀects of registration rely on the included observables to control for the
endogenous variation on the observed registration status. To the extent that plot level unobservables
lead registration, these estimates will be biased (they would be in particular biased upwards if higher
quality land is more likely to be registered and receive investment).
5 Credit eﬀects
Since the seminal contribution of Feder et al. (1988) who found credit supply eﬀects to be the main
mechanisms through which beneﬁts of land titling came about in Thailand, titling and registration
interventions have often been justiﬁed on credit access grounds. As has been seen earlier, these eﬀects
are neither a necessary condition for beneﬁts, in the sense that security on its own may well be enough
to increase investment and private returns, nor a suﬃcient condition, insofar as it is not obvious in
many situations that access to capital is the main constraint faced by farmers. Other factors, such as
access to technology or markets (Carter et al., 1994) may well be more important.
Moreover, given the lack of penetration of formal ﬁnancial institutions in rural Nicaragua, many
farmers may not have access to formal credit regardless of their formal ownership status as they are
not wealthy enough to be considered proﬁtable customers. Although the main focus of her paper is the
distribution of land property rights as opposed to their deﬁnition, Bandiera (2002) ﬁnds that the wealth
of farmers matters for the choice of crops when the farmer owns the land, which can be interpreted as
the evidence indicative of credit rationing.
205.1 Characteristics of credit transactions
An examination of recorded credit transactions (table [16]) shows that titled land is the single most
common form of collateral, as it is the form of collateral of choice in 35% of the recorded credit
transactions and 60% of the transactions with formal ﬁnancial intermediaries. Second and third in the
list are the harvest (although this is due to semiformal and informal transactions, which is in line with a
moral hazard problem either in production or in repayment incentives) and cattle. In the 2000 sample,
35% of credit transactions are secured by land, 20% by harvest and 12% by cattle. The percentages are
60%, 7% and 12% in the formal supervised sector. On the other hand, very few credit transactions are
secured with untitled land (2% of transactions in the sample).
We can also notice that the length of credit depends on the source, with formal intermediaries
granting mostly long-term (over 60% of loans have maturity of one year or more) credit while semi-
formal sources grant 57% of total loans over six months or less and less than 10% of loans with maturity
of more than one year. The largest contributors (in terms of number of loans) in the semiformal sector
are NGO or assistance projects and government programmes. This is important in the interpretation
of a possible causal eﬀect between land titles and investment because short-term credit (6 months and
less) is more likely to be used as working capital for the purchase of inputs. Use of more or better
inputs, such as seeds or fertilizer would in turn increase the return from land attached investment and
land improvements. However if credit is the constraint limiting those investments, the availability of
working capital will not be enough to satisfy credit needs.
Moreover, the use of land as collateral for long-term credit is restricyted to private banks and to
some development projects.
Credit use, especially from formal banks, is low in the sample, with only 4.2% of households receiving
credit from formal, regulated sources. However, this does not preclude the existence of an important
credit eﬀect. Indeed, 28% of households use some form of credit, most from the unregulated formal
sector and as can be seen in table [18], titled land is also used as a guarantee by unregulated institutions,
while untitled land almost never is.
Overall, however, credit rationing does not seem to be the main constraint faced by farmers. Just
under 50% of respondents say they would get credit from a regulated formal institution if they requested
it, while 62% say they would get credit from an unregulated formal institution. The lack of credit use
seems to be caused by the lack of investment opportunities that justify the rates charged by lending
institutions or the risk of losing the collateral rather than by non-price rationing.
5.2 A test of the credit eﬀect
As discussed, among others, by Besley (1995), if property rights bring about beneﬁts via better access
to credit markets, this eﬀect will be household rather than plot-speciﬁc. This is because if the eﬀect
of registration is to increase the collateral value of the land, the household will still be able to choose
what the extra available funds are used for. We can therefore test for credit eﬀects by adding to the
baseline regression a variable that measures the legal status of other plots held by the household.
Registration rather than ownership is taken as the main determinant of credit availability because
mortgages need to be registered, therefore registration is a precondition for the use of land as collateral
in a formal credit agreement. Moreover, we also consider the possibility that the eﬀect of other plots’
status depend on the considered plot’s registration status by including an interaction term.
Two variables are used for this purpose: total land registered other than the plot and a dummy
variable indicating whether there are other registered plots. Area would determine the price of the other
plots and hence their collateral value, therfore it measures the increase in credit ration — if the household
is credit-rationed. The dummy variable treats as identical all other plots if they are registered, and
therefore will test whether there is investment displacement, given that the cost of the investments
studied is independent of plot area for the large part.
21The studied speciﬁcation is the following
∆Ip = β1Rp + β2R−p + β3Rp ∗ R−p + δXp + εp,h,t (3)
Where Rp and R−p represent the variables describing own and other plots respectively, X represents
all controls (time and household indexes have been omitted).
A pure credit eﬀect would increase total investment, so that β2 > 0 and β3 =0(if only the sum of
registration status or average registration matters).
A pure security eﬀect would increase investment in any plot that is registered. If total investment is
not otherwise constrained, this would imply β1 > 0,β2 =0and β3 =0 . However, if total investment is
ﬁxed and an increase in security leads to an increase in investment in the plot with increased security,
t h a tw o u l dl e a dt oβ1 > 0,β2 < 0 and β1 + β2 + β3 =0 , that is, if all plots are registered, there is no
increase in investment.
Results are presented in Table [17], where columns (1) and (2) present results for other registered
area and columns (3) and (4) present results using a dummy variable for other plots’ registration.
While the coeﬃcient on the variable based on area is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from when entered on
its own, it is negative and signiﬁcant when the interaction term is entered and has the same magnitude
as the interaction term (a Wald test cannot reject that the sum is zero). Therefore there is no evidence
of a credit eﬀect from this speciﬁcation: when a plot is not registered, registering another plot will tend
to decrease investment; if a plot is registered, the area of other plots registered does not matter for
investment.
The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable when entered on its own is negative and signiﬁcant and the
size of the coeﬃcient is independent of the studied plot’s registration status as shown from the lack of
signiﬁcance of the interaction term.
Overall, results are somewhat mixed as to whether the eﬀect of registering all plots is positive or
zero. They do suggest that the eﬀect of having another plot registered is that of displacing investment
away from the studied plot and towards the other registered plot. There is, according to this test, no
evidence of a credit link at work.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The evidence presented from a programme of land titling in Nicaragua suggests that land titling sig-
niﬁcantly increased land-attached investments. The absence of evidence of enhanced access to formal
credit, in turn, leads us to conclude that the intervention had the eﬀect of increasing security and that
this was the main channel through which it provided beneﬁts. The ability to observe households with
multiple plots allows us to examine this channel in depth without fear of contamination by the presence
of unobserved household characteristics.
We can conclude that the legal status of ownership matters for economic outcomes. In particular,
beyond the perceived security granted by titles themselves, registration was found to have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on land-attached investments. This is remarkable because it corresponds to diﬀerences in the
(theoretical) legal protection of property rights in a society that questions openly its judicial system,
where the legal ediﬁce that underpins property rights over land is complex and often exhibits contra-
dictory propositions, and where we would not necessarily expect producers to have a high level of legal
sophistication.
We ﬁnd, however, no clear indicative evidence of a credit supply link. This is not surprising given
the macroeconomic conditions in Nicaragua during the period of study, in particular the application of
a structural adjustment programme with the consequence of severe credit tightening (and the disap-
pearance of several major banks, including the public development bank). Our evidence points rather
to a reallocation of investment towards more secure land.
22Results on the possible endogeneity of legal ownership status are mixed but they do suggest that
careful attention should be paid to the evolution of legal rights. While the need to study the determi-
nants of de facto property rights has been recognised in the literature, our results suggest that agents
endeavour to have their rights recognised legally and that tenure forms cannot be taken as given. On
the one hand, this suggests that even in situations where the legal framework is mistrusted, legal rights
have value and it would be hasty to conclude that titling and registration interventions have no positive
eﬀects. On the other hand, it also means that descriptions of legal status at one point in time may not
be suﬃcient to describe future tenure security in environments where the property regime is changing.
In those situations, the determinants of the perceived validity of legal protection of property rights
deserve more careful attention as they ultimately underpin the property rights system itself.
Finally, all local factors have been taken as given in this study, as in most of the literature. While the
need to study the determinants of individual property rights has been recognised before, the importance
of local property rights regimes means that the determinants of local arrangements also deserve further
attention.
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26AD a t a
The main data source is the Estudio de las Dinámicas de la Economía Rural (Study of Rural Economy
Dynamics), a survey conducted by the World Bank, the University of Wisconsin and FIDEG, a local
NGO between February and April 2000. The sample is constructed from three diﬀerent sub-samples,
whose construction is described here.
The main sub-sample was constructed for a household survey carried out in 1996 by the Ministry of
Agriculture (MAGFOR) and the FAO with assistance from USAID. The sample design for this survey
was realised in two phases. The ﬁrst phase is the method used by MAGFOR for their Agriculture
and Production surveys. Each department is stratiﬁed according to the intensity of cultivation and an
area-representative sample is selected using an area sample frame52 to yield a sample of 5600 producer
units. The sample covers all departments except for the two Atlantic regions. Of those, a portion of
RAAS (the western agricultural frontier) is included and only occasional observations of RAAN are
included due to border issues. The household sample was selected as a second-phase sample from the
1996 Postrera/Apante survey53 using the inverse of the probability of selection in the ﬁrst sampling
stage as the set of sampling weights except for non-agricultural land and large farms (more than 500
manzanas), which were excluded, and small farms (less than 5 manzanas), which were all included. The
resulting sample can be considered a random sample of farms and comprises 1357 households.54
The second sub-sample consists of producers having beneﬁted from the governmental titling pro-
gramme between 1994 and 1997 and the sample was constructed using the oﬃcial database of bene-
ﬁciaries as a sample frame. It only covers 8 of the country’s 16 departments, 3 in the Paciﬁcr e g i o n
(León, Chinandega and Rivas), 3 in the Northern region (Nueva Segovia, Jinotega and Matagalpa) and
2 in the Central region (Chontales and Río San Juan). The choice of departments is best seen as a
stratiﬁcation of the sampling carried out in order to ensure that all relevant forms of cultivation are
included. This sample comprised 458 households, which were actually found and interviewed55.
A third sub-sample of 372 rural households with little or no land was sampled from a rural household
panel surveyed by FIDEG in 1996.
Finally, 289 households, which were not part of the original sampled households, were found farming
the land selected in the above three samples and were surveyed as well. This includes replacement
households when the original sample households were not found as well as households found farming
one of several plots farmed in 1996 by the original sample household.
52An area frame sample is constructed by drawing a random set of points on topographic maps for each stratum. Thus,
the probability of selection within a stratum is proportional to the size of the segment or farm.
53MAGFOR’s Encuesta de Granos Básicos (Staple Grains survey) is repeated for each agricultural season.
54For the construction of the MAGFOR “Basic grains” sample see Garibay and Steiner (1998). For the construction of
the MAGFOR/FAO sample, see Davis, Carletto and Sil (1997).
55This is the same sample used by Deininger and Chamorro (2004).
27Number of plots Sample proportion (%)
N=3214
Type of document held
None 61 1.9
Certificate of possession 62 1.93
Private sale document 202 6.29
Provisional title 17 0.53
Public deed 1,884 58.64
Agrarian reform title 944 29.38
Communal title 14 0.44
Supplementary title 15 0.47
Judicial document 8 0.25
Indigenous title 6 0.19
Registration status
Registered 2237 69.75
In process of registration 294 9.17






Agrarian Reform 592 18.42
Other access 15 0.47
Descriptive statistics: tenure type - Owned plots only
TABLE 1










Farmyard 746 23.2% 189 5.9%
Hen run 70 2.2% 24 0.7%
Farmyard (poultry) 13 0.4% 8 0.2%
Pigsty 75 2.3% 33 1.0%
Basin 252 7.8% 57 1.8%
Anti-tick basin 14 0.4% 4 0.1%
Stable/shed 16 0.5% 6 0.2%
Fodder silo 12 0.4% 0
Cattle-specific investment 902 28.1% 282 8.8%
Non cattle-specific investments
Depulping facility 129 4.0% 24 0.7%
Packaging facility 1 0.0% 0
“Beneficio”
* 48 1.5% 13 0.4%
Mill 57 1.8% 10 0.3%
Warehouse 108 3.4% 30 0.9%
Grain Silo 98 3.0% 41 1.3%
Oven 71 2.2% 14 0.4%
Drying yard 20 0.6% 7 0.2%
Shed 36 1.1% 18 0.6%
Irrigation well 18 0.6% 7 0.2%
Dykes or ditches 22 0.7% 4 0.1%
Irrigation pivot 3 0.1% 0
Non-cattle specific investment 409 12.7% 138 4.3%
Fixed investment dummy 1090 33.9% 375 11.7%
Note:
Description of fixed investments
TABLE 2
A “beneficio” is the set of facilities used to clean, dry and roast coffee or cocoa.
29(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registered 0.034 0.032 0.043
(2.35)* (2.49)* (3.53)**
Registered public deed 0.055
(2.44)*
Registered agrarian reform title 0.041
(2.49)*
Certificate of possession -0.015 -0.025 -0.009 0.005
(0.26) (0.42) (0.14) (0.08)
Private sale document 0.044 0.032 0.024 0.023
(0.94) (1.00) (0.61) (0.59)
Provisional title -0.042 -0.063 -0.024 -0.004
(0.47) (1.82)+ (0.75) (0.11)
Public deed 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.017
(0.65) (0.53) (0.70) (0.37)
Agrarian reform title -0.030 -0.022 -0.007 -0.008
(0.69) (0.55) (0.17) (0.19)
Communal title -0.021 -0.008 -0.006 -0.090
(0.22) (0.10) (0.06) (1.56)
Supplementary title 0.037 0.036 0.084 0.095
(0.40) (0.37) (0.83) (0.82)
Judicial document -0.082 -0.072 -0.127 -0.124
(0.69) (1.87)+ (1.69)+ (1.64)
Indigenous title -0.082 -0.034 -0.117 -0.119
(0.60) (0.91) (2.81)** (2.88)**
Constant 0.082 0.086 0.070 0.072
(1.98)* (2.32)* (1.84)+ (1.91)+
Fixed effects no region municipal municipal
Observations 3213 3206 3206 3206
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.08
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
TABLE 3
Linear probability model: ownerhip documents only
All regressions except (1) with standard errors clustered at municipal level (2) includes region fixed effects (3) 
and (4) include municipal fixed effects.
Dependent variable: Fixed Investment 96-99 (dummy)
30(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registered 0.048 0.047 0.051 0.051
(1.93)+ (1.93)+ (4.04)** (4.00)**
Agrarian reform title received after 
1990 -0.028 -0.021
(0.97) (0.74)
Document received after 1990 0.043 0.031
(2.17)* (1.37)
Length of possession (years) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.80) (0.14) (0.25)
Plot acquired after 1990 0.042 0.037
(1.95)+ (2.04)*
Plot acquired through land reform -0.002
(0.12)
Plot acquired through land reform 
after 1990 -0.027
(0.86)
Certificate of possession 0.150 0.158 -0.014 -0.011
(1.10) (1.15) (0.22) (0.18)
Private sale document 0.237 0.243 0.013 0.016
(1.76)+ (1.77)+ (0.33) (0.41)
Provisional title 0.244 0.248 -0.037 -0.033
(1.42) (1.41) (1.11) (0.98)
Public deed 0.252 0.259 0.019 0.023
(1.91)+ (1.93)+ (0.44) (0.53)
Agrarian reform title 0.224 0.228 -0.010 -0.014
(1.73)+ (1.72)+ (0.23) (0.31)
Communal title 0.271 0.279 0.001 -0.009
(1.48) (1.51) (0.01) (0.10)
Supplementary title 0.323 0.333 0.082 0.083
(1.92)+ (1.96)* (0.84) (0.84)
Judicial document 0.063 0.071 -0.129 -0.127
(0.36) (0.38) (1.77)+ (1.76)+
Indigenous title 0.105 0.111 -0.117 -0.114
(0.79) (0.81) (2.53)* (2.49)*
Constant -0.177 -0.168 0.058 0.058
(1.32) (1.20) (1.24) (1.27)
Observations 2384 2384 3206 3206
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
TABLE 4
Linear probability model: ownerhip documents and date of document/acquisition
All regressions  with standard errors clustered at municipal level and municipal fixed effects.
Dependent variable: Fixed Investment 96-99 (dummy)
Date of document Date of acquisition
31Dependent variable: Fixed Investment 96-99 (dummy) Baseline model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registered 0.051 0.051 0.046 0.047
(4.57)** (4.67)** (4.47)** (4.57)**
Plot acquired after 1990 0.045 0.038 0.036 0.039
(2.52)* (2.09)* (1.93)+ (2.07)*
Length of possession (years) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.26) (0.55) (0.48) (0.64)
Area 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
(2.48)* (2.35)* (2.54)* (2.95)**
Square of area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.44) (1.40) (1.71)+ (2.14)*
Distance -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.06) (0.35) (0.35) (0.15)
Investment in 1990 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.69) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46)
Hilly 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026
(1.43) (1.45) (1.42) (1.44)
Sheer face 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.003
(0.05) (0.28) (0.38) (0.17)
Slope 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.012
(0.42) (0.54) (0.53) (0.51)
Other topography -0.030 -0.026 -0.021 -0.029
(0.38) (0.33) (0.25) (0.35)
FIDEG sample -0.035 -0.042 -0.042
(0.88) (0.99) (0.98)
Titling sample 0.006 0.010 0.013
(0.30) (0.52) (0.71)
Follow-up sample 0.051 0.046 0.046
(2.65)** (2.40)* (2.40)*
Males over 12 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(1.45) (1.55) (1.44)
Females over 12 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.59) (0.82) (0.83)
One literate in household  0.043 0.045 0.044
(2.01)* (2.30)* (2.22)*
Distance to wholesaler 0.000 -0.000
(0.02) (0.07)
Distance to paved road -0.001 -0.001
(2.02)* (2.20)*
Had a TV in 96 -0.032
(2.60)**
Constant 0.035 0.049 0.083 0.090
(1.56) (0.58) (0.99) (1.05)
Observations 3197 3197 3140 3140
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
Robust t statistics in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions with standard errors clustered at municipal level
Note: OLS regressions. All regressions with municipal fixed effects. Household controls: subsample dummies,  age of head, 
age of head squared, female head, education of head, males over 12, females over 12, literacy (at least one literate in 
household), TV ownership in 1996, radio ownership in 1996, other property (non-agricultural), dwelling with earth floor, 
distance to wholesaler. Plot controls: dummies for topographical characteristics (hilly, sloping, sheer face in plot).
TABLE 5
Linear probability model: Plot and household controls




Plot acquired after 1990 0.039 0.038
(2.07)* (2.04)*








Investment in 1990 0.005 0.005
(0.46) (0.50)
One literate in household 0.044 0.050
(2.22)* (2.55)*
Distance to paved road -0.001 -0.000
(2.20)* (1.61)
Agricultural machinery 1990 (C$ million) 0.005 0.002
(0.78) (0.37)
Had a TV in 96 -0.032 -0.030
(2.60)** (2.40)*
Has non-agricultural land -0.012
(0.65)
Value of cattle (C$ million) 0.164
(5.59)**
non-agricultural capital (C$ million) 0.051
(7.01)**
Total area owned individually in 1990 -0.003
(5.35)**






Robust t statistics in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions with standard errors clustered at municipal level
Note: OLS regressions. All regressions with municipal fixed effects. Household controls and plot 
controls as described. Wealth controls include TV ownership in 96, radio ownership in 96, dwelling 
with earth floor, capital owned, land owned in 1990.



















Registered 0.047 0.041 0.057 0.060 0.047
(3.00)** (0.97) (2.28)* (1.90)+ (2.18)*
Plot acquired after 1990 0.035 -0.034 0.070 -0.006 0.090
(1.33) (0.42) (1.79)+ (0.08) (2.94)**
Length of possession 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.93) (0.01) (0.30) (0.30) (0.49)
Area 0.016 0.033 0.006 0.015 0.004
(2.71)** (1.12) (2.73)** (0.62) (1.72)+
Distance -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.31) (0.37) (0.27) (1.09) (0.11)
Investment in 1990 0.004 -0.033 -0.001 -0.017 -0.009
(0.42) (1.73)+ (0.02) (0.85) (0.48)
One literate in household 0.052 0.070 -0.062 0.073 -0.034
(2.09)* (1.10) (0.83) (1.33) (0.51)
Distance to paved road -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(2.57)* (0.28) (1.60) (0.41) (2.18)*
Agricultural machinery (1990 ) 0.006 -0.076 0.007 -0.062 0.010
(0.61) (0.94) (2.25)* (0.34) (1.79)+
Other controls (Plots and household) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1625 359 1062 359 1062
R-squared 0.13 0.29 0.16 0.28 0.18
Robust t statistics in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Linear probability model: Plots by main use
Note: OLS regressions. All regressions with standard errors clustered at municipal level. All regressions with municipal fixed effects. Household controls and plot 













Registered 0.023 0.025 0.036
(2.06)* (2.64)** (2.52)*
Plot acquired after 1990 -0.004 0.036 0.049
(0.16) (2.60)** (2.86)**
Length of possession (years) -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.11) (0.01) (0.13)
Area 0.034 0.003 0.003
(2.72)** (1.80)+ (1.37)
Distance -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(1.55) (0.11) (0.09)
Investment in 1990 -0.017 -0.002 -0.003
(1.86)+ (0.29) (0.30)
Distance to wholesaler -0.001 0.000 0.000
(2.77)** (0.61) (0.52)
Distance to paved road -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(3.47)** (1.37) (1.56)
Agricultural machinery 1990 (C$ millions) 0.005 0.006 0.009
(1.72)+ (1.14) (0.83)
Constant -0.072 0.082 0.153
(1.00) (0.92) (1.19)
Plot controls Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes
Household asset controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 766 3140 2374
R-squared 0.25 0.10 0.12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Linear probability model: Different types of investment - regressions according to cattle ownerhip
Note: OLS regressions. All regressions with standard errors clustered at municipal level. All regressions with municipal 
fixed effects. Household controls and plot controls as described. Wealth controls include TV ownership in 96, radio 
ownership in 96, dwelling with earth floor, capital owned, land owned in 1990.
TABLE 8
35Number of plots Number of households
Registration
All plots in household 1906 1336
None 612 466
Some but not all 691 224
Investment
All plots in household 200 188
None 2560 1681
Some but not all 454 157
Variation in registration and investment 176 52
Total 3209 2026
Intrahousehold variation in investment and registration
TABLE 9










Sample: households with more than one plot
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registered 0.047 0.067 0.062 0.061
(4.27)** (2.69)** (1.90)+ (1.88)+




Plot acquired after 1990 0.025 0.037 0.037 0.031
(1.00) (1.17) (0.87) (0.73)
Length of possession (years) 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.66) (1.61) (1.11) (0.94)
Area 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.97)* (2.34)* (1.64) (1.65)+
Square of area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.06) (1.77)+ (1.46) (1.46)
Distance 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.94) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06)
Investment in 1990 0.008 0.024 0.023 0.023
(0.51) (1.81)+ (1.07) (1.08)
Distance to paved road -0.001
(2.00)*
Agricultural machinery 1990 (million C$) -0.002
(0.65)
Had a TV in 96 -0.038
(2.33)*
Dwelling floor earth -0.030
(1.57)
Parents owned land (area) -0.001
(1.07)
Fixed effects municipal household household household
Constant 0.065 -0.018 -0.015 0.026
(0.57) (0.46) (0.24) (0.39)
Observations 1894 1894 1916 1916
R-squared 0.15 0.46 0.47 0.47
Robust t statistics in brackets
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Linear probability model: household fixed effects 
Note: OLS regressions. (1) with municipal fixed effects and errors robust to intra-municipal error correlation, controls for age of 
head, age of head squared, female head, education of head, males over 12, females over 12, literacy (at least one literate in 
household), TV ownership, radio ownership, other property, dwelling with earth floor. (2) to (4) with household fixed effects.(2) 
with robust standard errors. (3) and (4) with cluster effects-robust standard errors. All include dummies for topographical 
characteristics (hilly, sloping, sheer face in plot).
TABLE 10
37Dependent variable: Fixed Investment 96-99  (1) (2)
Sample: Legalized plots only Household controls Household fixed effects
Correctly registered 0.047 0.105
(1.86)+ (4.39)**




Plot acquired after 1990 0.022 0.076
(0.45) (0.91)












Household controls Yes .
Observations 534 267
R-squared 0.24 0.63
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions with standard errors clustered at municipal level
Investment Linear probability model: Legalized plots
Note: Regressions only for legalized plots. Column (1) includes controls also for age of head, age of head 
squared, education of head, presence of one literate person in household, TV and radio ownership, whether the 
dwelling has a soil floor. Column (2) includes household fixed effects. 
TABLE 11
38Mode of  Current 
plot is registered access document Augmented











Certificate of possession 0.230 0.035 -0.029
(3.53)** (0.61) (0.41)
Private sale document -0.051 -0.115 -0.181
(0.91) (1.65)+ (2.40)*
Provisional title 0.440 0.411 0.348
(2.85)** (4.51)** (2.83)**
Public deed 0.707 0.288 0.220
(15.33)** (6.05)** (3.58)**
Agrarian reform title 0.485 0.026 -0.039
(8.62)** (0.44) (0.56)
Communal title 0.301 0.078 0.006
(2.26)* (0.70) (0.05)
Supplementary title 0.202 -0.024 -0.094
(1.26) (0.12) (0.48)
Judicial document -0.206 -0.732 -0.802
(2.89)** (6.68)** (6.49)**
None * Bought -0.115
(1.51)
None * Squatted -0.527
(5.39)**
None * Donated -0.234
(3.07)**
None * Land reform 0.009
(0.12)
None * Other access -0.445
(2.10)*
Plot acquired after 1990 -0.026 -0.052 -0.046 -0.037
(0.74) (1.41) (1.42) (1.20)
Length of possession (years) 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(3.20)** (2.21)* (2.79)** (3.40)**
Female Head -0.030 -0.037 -0.059 -0.064
(0.95) (1.31) (1.78)+ (1.98)*
Education of Head 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.017
(3.17)** (2.58)** (2.42)* (2.56)*
One literate in household 0.089 0.089 0.073 0.080
(2.10)* (2.18)* (1.82)+ (1.94)+
Distance to wholesaler -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(2.07)* (2.35)* (2.18)* (2.26)*
Constant 0.481 -0.098 0.274 0.341
(4.18)** (0.81) (2.30)* (2.69)**
3133 3133 3133 3133
0.25 0.41 0.31 0.32
Partial R-squared of instruments 0.23 0.10 0.11
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
TABLE 12
Note: OLS regressions. All with municipal fixed effects and standard errors robust to clustering at the municipal 
level. Other controls include topographical dummies, age of head, subsample fixed effects, number of adults 
males and females in the household, tv ownership, radio ownership, earth floor in dwelling.
Observations
R-squared
First stage regressions of registration status
Dependent variable:  Document at acquisition
Mode of access:
Document type:
39Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4)











Registered 0.047 0.062 0.062 0.047
(3.45)** (2.22)* (2.25)* (1.86)+
Plot acquired after 1990 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.033
(2.23)* (2.26)* (2.12)* (1.94)+
Length of possession 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.70) (0.62) (0.58) (0.36)
Area 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
(4.32)** (4.21)** (2.90)** (2.74)**
Area squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(2.07)* (2.00)* (2.06)* (1.96)+
Distance -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.50)
Investment in 1990 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.002
(0.71) (0.70) (0.49) (0.22)
One literate in household 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.039
(1.72)+ (1.67)+ (2.33)* (2.23)*
Distance to paved road -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.98)* (1.96)* (2.30)* (2.98)**
Agricultural machinery (1990) 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.008
(0.62) (0.64) (0.80) (1.48)
Owned TV in 96 -0.032 -0.033 -0.033 -0.036
(2.09)* (2.14)* (2.63)** (3.22)**
Dwelling with earth floor -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.024
(1.59) (1.57) (1.62) (2.04)*
Parents owned area -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(1.82)+ (1.83)+ (1.22) (1.01)
Constant 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009
(1.39) (1.40) (3.66)** (4.31)**
Observations 3133 3133 3133 3133
R-squared 0.03
Overid test statistic Sargan = 6.483 Hansen J = 9.198 Hansen J = 9.198
P-value 0.485 0.239 0.239
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Investment - Instrumental Variables Results
Note: all regressions include controls for age of head, female head, education of head, tv and radio ownership  as well as 
dummies for topographical characteristics (hilly, sloping, sheer face in plot) as described for the baseline specification.
TABLE 13
40Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3)









Registered 0.050 0.050 0.076
(1.23) (1.26) (2.33)*
Plot acquired after 1990 0.039 0.039 0.025
(2.24)* (2.13)* (1.64)
Length of possession 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.68) (0.62) (0.12)
Area 0.005 0.005 0.005
(4.23)** (2.92)** (2.93)**
Area squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(2.04)* (2.15)* (2.18)*
Distance -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.17) (0.20) (0.48)
Investment in 1990 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.71) (0.50) (0.31)
One literate in household 0.045 0.045 0.033
(1.70)+ (2.29)* (2.01)*
Distance to paved road -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.98)* (2.34)* (3.33)**
Agricultural machinery (1990) 0.005 0.005 0.007
(0.62) (0.77) (1.59)
Owned TV in 96 -0.032 -0.032 -0.036
(2.09)* (2.62)** (3.17)**
Dwelling with earth floor -0.021 -0.021 -0.026
(1.59) (1.67)+ (2.30)*
Parents owned area -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(1.83)+ (1.22) (0.93)
Constant 0.008 0.008 0.007
(1.40) (3.68)** (4.62)**
Observations 3133 3133 3133
R-squared 0.04
Overid test statistic Sargan = 7.421 Hansen J = 7.582 Hansen J = 7.582
P-value 0.829 0.817 0.817
Robust t statistics in parentheses in (2) and (3). Absolute values of t statistics in (1)
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Investment - Instrumental Variables Results - Alternative Instrument set
Note: all regressions include controls for age of head, female head, education of head, tv and radio 
ownership  as well as dummies for topographical characteristics (hilly, sloping, sheer face in plot) as 
described for the baseline specification.
TABLE 14




Baseline model, no fixed effects 3,124 0.042 0.015 0.072 0.102
Baseline model, fixed effects 3,011 0.070 0.041 0.093 0.203
Augmented model 3,117 0.037 0.006 0.070 0.220
Augmented model, fixed effects 2,933 0.062 0.028 0.091 0.304
Unmatched 3207 0.046 P-value 0.000
*Bias-corrected confidence intervals calculated with N=200 bootstrap sample replications.
Bias-corrected 95% 
confidence interval*

















Titled land  51 13 64 13 15 5 32 4 69
Untitled land 5 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 2
Housing 4 5 9 7 3 4 2 2 18
Harvest 5 3 8 20 6 1 19 15 61
Cattle 6 7 13 11 4 2 15 0 32
Vehicles/machinery 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 4
Third party 0 1 1 3 3 0 8 12 26
Group guarantee 0 1 1 2 2 0 9 8 21
None 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 2 1 3 1 7 0 16 3 27








Other farmer Family & 
Friends
Other
Titled land  2 12 1 0 0 1 16 149
Untitled land 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 9
Housing 1 0 3 0 0 0 4 31
Harvest 1 15 0 1 1 0 18 87
Cattle 2 0 4 1 0 1 8 53
Vehicles/machinery 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 8
Third party 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 30
Group guarantee 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 23
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Other 2 1 2 0 106 3 6
Total 9 30 12 2 2 5 60 427
TABLE 16
Type of collateral required, by credit source
Formal Semiformal (unregulated institutional credit)
Informal
43Dependent variable: 
Fixed Investment 96-99  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Registered 0.047 0.042 0.054 0.058
(4.57)** (3.91)** (5.13)** (3.71)**
Other registered area -0.000 -0.001
(0.03) (3.33)**
Registered x Other area registered 0.002
(4.15)**
Other registered plots (d) -0.061 -0.054
(4.44)** (2.71)**
Registered x Other registered (d) -0.011
(0.46)
Plot acquired after 1990 0.039 0.039 0.044 0.044
(2.07)* (2.09)* (2.27)* (2.26)*
Length of possession (years) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.64) (0.63) (0.61) (0.61)
Area 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
(2.95)** (2.93)** (2.97)** (2.99)**
Investment in 1990 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.46) (0.43) (0.23) (0.23)
Plot and Household controls as in baseline model
Constant 0.090 0.092 0.080 0.079
(1.05) (1.07) (0.94) (0.94)
Observations 3140 3140 3140 3140
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
P-value of test on other+interaction 0.686 0.000
P-value of test on register+other+interaction 0.684
Robust t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
TABLE 17
Note: all regressions include controls for age of head, female head, education of head, tv and radio ownership, parental owned area, area 
and area squared as well as dummies for topographical characteristics (hilly, sloping, sheer face in plot) as described for baseline 
specification.
Effect of other plots' registration status - credit effect test
Other area Other plots (dummy)
44Number of households 2475 1357 371 458 289
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Total area owned (mzs.) 46.65 (143.03) 57.08 (125.71) 2.21 (11.40) 26.97 (36.95) 85.91 (306.20)
registered 38.06 (135.94) 47.72 (113.95) 1.94 (10.89) 17.95 (30.48) 70.96 (303.53)
untitled 0.28 (3.97) 0.30 (4.88) 0.02 (0.24) 0.34 (2.88) 0.39 (3.10)
with escritura 34.57 (136.98) 46.89 (118.35) 1.87 (10.84) 4.19 (15.38) 66.82 (300.19)
with AR title 8.36 (32.37) 5.86 (32.06) 0.27 (3.70) 21.87 (34.53) 9.09 (43.00)
with provisional title 0.72 (11.96) 0.74 (11.69) 0.03 (0.24) 0.36 (2.90) 2.06 (23.88)
with informal title 0.64 (9.51) 0.94 (12.36) 0.03 (0.34) 0.12 (1.17) 0.84 (7.31)
Total value of land ('000 C$) 101.48 (349.52) 132.89 (410.49) 5.44 (22.30) 59.92 (281.13) 143.17 (330.12)
Machinery value 1990 ('000 C$) 35.30 (586) 56.67 (784) 0.14 (2) 14.88 (141) 12.51 (131)
Machinery value 1997 ('000 C$) 32.32 (415) 49.76 (550) 0.31 (2) 16.45 (143) 16.72 (133)
Total savings ('000 C$) 4.21 (21) 4.97 (22) 0.84 (2) 3.47 (24) 6.14 (25)
Non-agricultural capital ('000 C$) 4.17 (102) 5.82 (137) 1.64 (11) 0.91 (5) 4.84 (22)
Value of cattle ('000 C$) 44.03 (137) 55.00 (124) 3.20 (13) 17.62 (43) 86.84 (285)
Value of minor livestock ('000 C$) 1.05 (2) 1.22 (2) 0.50 (1) 0.85 (1) 1.29 (2)
Literacy 0.64 (0.29) 0.67 (0.28) 0.65 (0.27) 0.54 (0.31) 0.68 (0.28)
Average age 27.81 (12.19) 29.79 (12.59) 24.85 (10.52) 25.45 (11.06) 26.03 (12.32)
Number of males over 12 2.35 (1.39) 2.50 (1.44) 2.12 (1.34) 2.16 (1.26) 2.20 (1.37)
Number of females over 12 2.07 (1.21) 2.17 (1.22) 2.05 (1.26) 1.89 (1.12) 1.90 (1.16)
Female head of household 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 0.15 (0.36) 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31)
TV ownership 0.34 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.40 (0.49) 0.26 (0.44) 0.38 (0.49)
Radio ownership 0.84 (0.36) 0.85 (0.35) 0.79 (0.41) 0.83 (0.38) 0.88 (0.32)
Ownership of other property 0.14 (0.35) 0.18 (0.38) 0.04 (0.19) 0.09 (0.29) 0.21 (0.41)
Housing with soil floor 0.63 (0.48) 0.57 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.78 (0.41) 0.57 (0.50)
Debt 1,163 (16,729) 1,199 (16,793) 66 (687) 1,397 (23,570) 2,033 (13,851)
Arrears dummy 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) 0.01 (0.10) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.15)
Access to formal credit (subjective) 0.50 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.19 (0.39) 0.40 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50)
Access to semiformal credit (subjective) 0.62 (0.48) 0.72 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.56 (0.50) 0.71 (0.46)
TABLE A1
Household summary statistics
WHOLE SAMPLE MAGFOR FIDEG TITULACION FOLLOW-UP
45N 3212 1960 87 637 528
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Area 35.91 (84.94) 39.50 (73.46) 9.41 (20.31) 19.33 (28.66) 47.02 (149.15)
Distance from house 5.40 (26.40) 5.39 (29.27) 2.45 (6.00) 1.91 (4.72) 10.18 (31.51)
Time since acquisition 13.82 (11.24) 16.53 (11.74) 15.10 (11.43) 11.25 (8.74) 6.63 (7.48)
Bought (d) 0.55 (0.50) 0.57 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50) 0.29 (0.46) 0.79 (0.41)
No document 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12) 0.06 (0.24) 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.13)
Certificate of possession 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14)
Private sale document 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.17) 0.12 (0.32)
Provisional title 0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 (0.11) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.11)
Public deed 0.59 (0.49) 0.76 (0.43) 0.70 (0.46) 0.12 (0.33) 0.50 (0.50)
Agrarian reform title 0.29 (0.46) 0.14 (0.34) 0.14 (0.35) 0.79 (0.41) 0.30 (0.46)
Communal title 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.08)
Supplementary title 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.08)
Registered 0.70 (0.46) 0.77 (0.42) 0.76 (0.43) 0.56 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49)
In registration process 0.09 (0.29) 0.04 (0.21) 0.09 (0.29) 0.22 (0.42) 0.11 (0.32)
Plot flat 0.35 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.56 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49)
Plot ondulated 0.32 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 0.25 (0.44) 0.21 (0.41) 0.31 (0.46)
Plot hilly  0.26 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) 0.09 (0.29) 0.25 (0.44) 0.22 (0.42)
Plot steep 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23) 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.05 (0.22)
Seasonal crops 0.45 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.43 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48)
Permanent crops 0.08 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.31) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.26)
Pasture 0.29 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.13 (0.33) 0.16 (0.36) 0.40 (0.49)
Forest 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.10) 0.03 (0.18) 0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.17)
Fallow 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.11) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17)
House plot 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19) 0.24 (0.43) 0.08 (0.26) 0.04 (0.19)
Fruit 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.06)
Conflict (d) 0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.11)
Value (C$) 81,341 (244,489) 96,183 (259,323) 27,285 (39,453) 43,837 (239,300) 80,656 (202,945)
Investment 90-99 (d) 0.17 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.02 (0.15) 0.16 (0.37) 0.21 (0.41)
Investment 96-99 (d) 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.32) 0.01 (0.11) 0.07 (0.26) 0.16 (0.36)
Plot level summary statistics (owned plots only)
TABLE A2
WHOLE SAMPLE MAGFOR FIDEG TITULACION FOLLOW-UP
46Variable Description
Fixed investment 96-99 Dummy for investment carried out.
Fixed investment 96-99 (cattle)  " - cattle specific
Fixed investment 96-99 (non-cattle) " - non cattle-specific
Registered Whether the title to the plot is in the Public Registry
Title type dummies No title (omitted), certificate of possession , private document,
provisional title,public deed, agrarian reform document, communal
title, supplementary title, judicial document, indigenous peoples' title 
Length of possession Years since acquisition
Area Area of plot (unit is 10 mzs.)
Square of area Square of area of plot 
Distance Distance from dwelling to plot (km)
Investment in 1990 Summation of considered fixed investment in 1990
Topographical dummies Flat (ommitted), hilly, sheer face in plot, sloping, other
Plot acquired after 1990 Dummy. 1 if plot was acquired after the end of 1990
Subsample dummies MAGFOR(omitted) , FIDEG, Titling, Follow-up
Age of Head in years
Age of Head squared
Female Head dummy for female head of household (self-declared)
Education of Head Categorical variable: highest achieved schooling level
Males over 12 Number of males over 12
Females over 12 Number of females over 12
One literate in household At least one person in the household can read and write (dummy)
Distance to wholesaler Distance to nearest wholesaler (in km)
Distance to paved road Distance to nearest paved road (in km)
Agricultural machinery 1990 Agricultural mobile capital owned in 1990 (in million C$)
Had a TV in 96 Dummy variable
Had a radio in 96 Dummy variable
Dwelling floor earth Dummy. 1 if the household dwelling's floor is earth/soil
Has non-agricultural land Dummy. 1 if the household owns at least one non-agricultural property
Land owned by parents (area) Area owned by parents of head at emancipation
Value of cattle (C$ million) Value of owned cattle (million C$)
non-agricultural capital (C$ million) Value of owned non-agricultural business assets (million C$)





Controls in Baseline specification
TABLE A3
List of covariates in baseline specification and dependent variables
Household level controls
Controls in Baseline specification
47